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1 Introduction 
 
The last referral of a case to the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was made concerning Libya 
situation
1
. UNSC resolution number 1970 referred the Libya situation to the 
ICC
2
. However, the ICC has a very special system by which it may declare 
a case admissible. The principle is called “complementarity” with its own 
unique functionality. It is designed to complete national judicial system in 
pursuing to “put an end to the impunity”3 where the State is “unwilling” or 
“unable” to carry out an investigation.4  Not so many cases have been 
referred to the ICC but Libya case is an unprecedented one both in 
international criminal justice system and in the history of the ICC. As to the 
triggering mechanism
5
, it is similar to the Sudan case
6
; both of them are 
referred to the ICC by the UNSC. Nevertheless, the Libya case is different 
from other cases in many respects. First, Libya is undergoing political 
reconstruction from a dictatorship resulting from the collapse of the State 
following a civil war as well as an international intervention. Second, Libya 
has challenged the ICC jurisdiction based on the active investigation of the 
case and of the suspects. Controversial point regarding the case is that the 
major suspect, Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi is not being held under the effective 
control of the Libyan Authorities. Instead, since the time of his arrest by the 
Militants the Libyan Authorities has failed to obtain him. Third, the Libya 
case does not just interact with Libya “unwillingness” or “inability”7 but in 
a multifaceted way it deals with various aspects of the “complementary 
principle”8; thus, any decision in this regard would help to improve the 
ambiguities of the complementary principle. Forth and more specifically, it 
deals with the “shadow side”9 of complementary principle mainly because 
                                                 
1
 United Nations Security Council Resolution no. 1970, 26 February 2011. Available at: 
www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/081A9013.../0/1970Eng.pdf  
2
 Ibid 
3
 Preamble of the Rome Statute, Para 5 and 10. 
4
 Even though that there are 4 grounds in defined in article 17 as criteria of admissibility, 
for the aim of the present study the focus will be on article 17 (1)(a) 
5
 There are three triggering mechanisms devised in the Rome Statute article 15 which, can 
be enumerated as 1- Self referral by a State party to the Rome Statute, 2- when the United 
Nations Security Council refer a case to the ICC acting under its chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter and 3- where the prosecutor initiate an investigation proprio muto 
6
 There have only been two cases referred to the ICC by the UNSC Resolutions so far. The 
first one is Sudan called as “Darfur” case referred to the ICC by the UNSCR No. 1593, 
2005 available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm and the 
second one was Libya. 
7
 According to article 17 which is the heart of the complementarity principle, a case 
becomes admissible before the Court where the State is “unwilling” or “unable” to carry 
out a prosecution or an investigation genuinely. The whole function of the article 17 will be 
explained in the next sub-headings. 
8
 The most fundamental principle of the Rome Statute is the complementarity principle. It 
will be discussed thoroughly in the first chapter of this paper. 
9
 Kevin John Heller, “The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The effect of Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute on the Principle of Due Process,” Criminal Law Forum (2006), 5. It concerns 
the thesis of “due process” and the violation of the human rights of the accused. It will be 
analyzed in 1.2.2.5.1, “due process in international law”. 
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this matter has not been addressed before; it, in particular, deals with the 
question of admissibility regarding the violation of the rights of the accused 
and admissibility of a case before the ICC. 
 
The Court shall deal with every aspect of the case, hence, whatever is the 
Court’s decision, it will be considered historical and breaks new grounds in 
the international criminal justice hemisphere. In addition, it reveals the ICC 
quiddity as a strictly legal or justice manager institution.  
 
The present study aims at applying the complementarity principle to the 
case of Libya, Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi. To this end, the main objective of this 
study is to address the following research question: concerning the Libya 
challenges to the admissibility before the ICC, what will be the possible 
outcome of the application of the complementarity regime in Libya case? In 
searching the potential answer to this question, owing to the 
complementarity principle nature, three main questions are required to be 
answered beforehand. Questions such as, whether Libya is actively 
investigating Saif Al-Islam, whether Libya is “willing” to investigate Saif 
Al-Islam and finally ‘whether Libya is “able” to investigate Saif Al-Islam 
Qaddafi. 
 
To answer the above-mentioned questions, it is necessary to first portray an 
overview of the relevant parts of the complementarity regime, article 17, in 
a chronicle order, though, for the purpose of providing an understanding of 
the principle, its other irrelevant parts to this thesis will shortly be 
introduced. It is purported that the Rome Statute carries ambiguities within 
article 17 wordings, thus in order to gain clarity in each relevant part, the 
interpretation of the principle given by various scholars will be taken into 
account first, while we will also consider the general rules of interpretation. 
Second, the ICC jurisprudence, where it exists, will be held as a very 
reliable source for clarifying ambiguities. Other international law, 
international human rights law and international criminal law jurisprudence 
will be drawn upon in order to aid the analysis. 
 
Then by considering the outcome of the first part and relevant issues of the 
complementarity principle, attempts will be devoted to apply the 
complementarity principle designed in the Rome Statute to the concrete case 
of Libya. Libya’s challenge to the admissibility will be examined first where 
the ICC’s test—the same person, same conduct—will be applied. 
Afterwards we will examine the arguments of Libyan authorities, who 
refused to provide the ICC with compelling evidence on the ground of 
confidentiality. Then the whole situation of Libya after revolution will be 
taken into consideration and the relevant part of the complementarity 
principle will be applied orderly. In doing so, the reports of the international 
commissions or other international institutions, news of reliable sources and 
facts presented before the ICC will be used. 
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1.1- Outline of the research 
 
This thesis consists of three chapters. Chapter I introduce the 
complementarity regime and admissibility as a whole and sheds some light 
on its controversial parts, called the “shadow side” of the complementarity 
regime by Kevin Heller
10
. This chapter starts with a description of the ICC 
jurisdiction before it portrays the relationship between the complementarity 
and admissibility. After that, the rationale behind complementarity is 
highlighted prior to examining the yardstick of the said regime, i.e. article 
17. Four grounds of admissibility will be discussed considering the existing 
Court’s ruling on some of its parts; the focus will be on the first ground. In 
the next sub-headings, the terms of “unwillingness” and “inability” are 
scrutinized; particular care has been given to the grounds of “unwillingness” 
and the theory of “due process”. Afterwards, for the sake of a better 
understanding of the complementarity regime and its procedures, the 
triggering mechanisms designed in the Rome Statute are briefly introduced 
and then the most controversial mechanism- the Security Council referral- is 
discussed. 
 
The second chapter introduces the application of the complementarity 
regime to the case of Libya currently being processed before the ICC. In 
order to do so, it provides a background of the current situation in Libya; it 
will discuss how the Libya case ended up in the ICC and provide the history 
of the Libya case before the International Criminal Court. Matters of the 
ICC jurisdiction over Libya, the effect of the Security Council referral, 
Libya’s obligation to cooperate with the ICC, and legal grounds to indict 
Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi are provided. The next headings are entirely devoted 
to the application of the complementarity principle chronically to each 
aspect of the Libya case according to the grounds stipulated in article 17, 
discussed in the first part of this thesis. The author will try to answer 
questions such as “is Libya willing to investigate Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi?” 
and “is Libya able to prosecute Saif Al-Islam Qadaffi?” 
 
The third chapter will offer the findings regarding the complementarity 
principle in the light of the ICC practice and its “shadow sides” as well as a 
final observation of the application of the complementary principle to the 
case of Libya; at last based on the findings, some conclusions will be 
presented.  
 
                                                 
10
 Ibid  
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Chapter 1: The Complementarity Regime of the 
ICC and Admissibility 
 
1-ICC Jurisdiction 
 
The Rome Statute has come into force in 2002 to put an end to impunity and 
prosecute those perpetrators of the gravest crimes against the peace and 
security of the world
11
. On the other hand, paragraph 10 of the Statute 
emphasizes that “…the International Criminal Court established under this 
Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.” Article 1 
of the Statute further asserts that the Court “shall have the power to exercise 
its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international 
concern [….] and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction.” 
While the Court has been established with an intention to have jurisdiction 
over the core crimes of international concern, its power is defined and 
limited to its complementarity regime perceived in the Rome Statute. 
Perhaps the preamble provides us with the intention of the drafters and the 
regime based on which the court is going to function. The first resort and 
emphasis of the preamble after prevention of those core crimes is by taking 
measures at the national level and enhancing international cooperation
12
. It 
then puts the duty on every State
13
 to exercise jurisdiction over those 
responsible for international crimes. Therefore, it may be inferred that the 
Rome Statute’s intent is to exercise jurisdiction over those crimes while 
respecting State sovereignty.  
 
Thus as we can see there are two jurisdictions that might possibly contradict 
each other: one is the State that has jurisdiction over the suspect(s) and the 
other is the Court that may claim jurisdiction due to the unwillingness or 
inability of the State concerned. Unlike other international criminal tribunals 
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the ICC has a 
vertical nature. This means that national jurisdiction over the crimes comes 
first and in the absence of effective prosecution (as it is defined by the Rome 
Statute to be the unwillingness or inability of States) the ICC jurisdiction 
comes later. Obviously, this is confined to dealing with certain crimes. 
 
Not all the crimes are of international character and among those that are, 
only a few certain crimes are within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Most of 
                                                 
11
 Preamble of the Rome Statute, Paragraph 5:  
“The States Parties to this Statute […] determined to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”  
12
 Preamble of the Rome Statute, paragraph 4:  
“Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a 
whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by 
taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation” 
13
 Preamble of the Rome Statute, paragraph 6: 
“crimes, Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over 
those responsible for international crimes,” 
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these are recognized as customary international crimes
14
. Nevertheless, there 
are three plus one crimes within the ICC jurisdiction. Article 5 of the Statute 
enumerates them as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity and 
crime of aggression. 
 
If any of these crimes are committed by individuals, the ICC may still not 
exercise jurisdiction owing to the fact that it is perceived to be the court of 
the last resort.  Since the complementarity principle is embedded into the 
Rome Statute as the most fundamental principle of the Rome Statute, any 
action triggered by the ICC may continue only if it passes the Rome Statute 
requirements contemplated in article 17. In response, a State may recourse 
to article 19 to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction and request the case to be 
declared inadmissible by the Court. The relationship between the 
Complementarity regime and the admissibility has been analysed below:  
 
 
1.2- Complementarity Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
 
The word complementary denotes the quality of completing something else 
so that two complementary entities complete one another or perfect others’ 
deficiencies
15
. In light of the general meaning of the term employed, the 
ICC, owing to the complementarity regime, is to complete the national 
criminal jurisdiction where it does not carry out proceedings compatible 
with the standards of the Court and international law. The complementarity 
of the ICC jurisdiction was so important to the States willing to ratify
16
 that 
in order to have the conference succeed; it had been agreed upon even 
before the conference began
17
.  
 
The principle is reflected in both the preamble and the body of the Rome 
Statute. The preamble and article 1 of the Statute contemplate the 
complementarity as a legal principle. Paragraph 10 reads as “Emphasizing 
that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions” 
 
In addition, article 1 asserts that: 
 
“International Criminal Court […] shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdiction.” 
 
                                                 
14
 Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary 
Reflections, EJIL 1999 
15
 CF the Oxford English Dictionary: the notion of complementarity has its own origin in 
atomic physic 
16
 The “state willing to ratify” is used instead of the “drafters” due to the fact that the Rome 
Statute had not drafted by State parties but rather by International Law Commission 
(hereinafter ILC). 
17
 Robert Cryer, Hakan Friman, Darryl Robinson, Elizabeth Wilmshurst,  An Introduction 
to International Criminal Law and Procedure, Cambridge University Press, Second Edition, 
Page 154. 
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Then article 17 and 20(3)
18
 transform them into legal rules
19
. According to 
the wording of article 17, every case shall be determined by the court. 
However, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence states that prior to the issue 
of admissibility, the court has to determine whether the case is in the 
Jurisdiction of the ICC
20
. Any observation relevant to the complementarity 
principle would require grasping the rationale behind ICC’s 
complementarity jurisdiction by which it primarily prioritizes national 
jurisdiction. The rationale behind the complementarity regime of the Rome 
Statute is discussed below. 
 
 
1.2.1- Rationale of the Complementarity 
 
The Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty. The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (hereinafter VCLT) requires that a treaty to be interpreted in 
a good faith and in the light of its object and purposes.  As the preamble 
contains, the object of the Rome Statute is “to put an end to the impunity”. 
The ICC shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdiction. It was 
pointed out that the complementarity was tremendously important to the 
drafters even before that the conference for adoption of the Rome Statute 
had begun. Therefore, in order to have a better understanding of the Rome 
Statute complementarity principle and its provisions that forms the 
principle; it seems pertinent to inquire about the rationale behind the 
creation of complementarity principle when we interpret the relevant part of 
the principle. 
 
There are multiple reasons why there should be a complementarity regime 
of the court, which are relevant to the current study.  
 
The first reason, as the preamble declares, is respect for state sovereignty. 
Interestingly, the preamble refers to every state’s duty to exercise 
jurisdiction over international crimes, not just state parties
21
, and if a state 
fails to do so, the ICC would step in and exercise jurisdiction to put an end 
to the impunity. 
                                                 
18
Rome Statute article 17 and 20 (3)  
19
 John K.Kleffner, “Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal 
Jurisdiction”, 99. By extraction from R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, he defines 
difference between legal principle and legal rules as follow:  ‘they differ in the character of 
the direction they give. Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule 
stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must 
be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes nothing to the decision.’ Principles, on 
the other hand, ‘do not set out legal consequences that follow automatically when the 
conditions provided are met.’ Rather, they incorporate into the law general goals and 
values, regularly specifying neither their subjects and their content in detail nor their 
conditions of application. 
20
 The ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 58(4): The court shall rule on any 
challenge or question of jurisdiction firs and then on any challenge or question of 
admissibility. 
21
 Preamble paragraph 6:  
“Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those 
responsible for international crimes.” 
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Secondly, article 5 of the Rome Statute asserts that these crimes are of 
international concern as a whole
22
, which infringes universal values. As a 
result, it appears that the interest of international community competes with 
state sovereignty concerning the interest of “international community in the 
effective prosecution of international crimes, the endeavour to put an end to 
impunity and the deterrence of the future commission of such crimes”23. 
Thus, complementarity is “primarily designed to strike a delicate balance 
between state sovereignty to exercise jurisdiction and the realization that, 
for the effective prevention of [grave international] crimes and impunity, the 
international community has to step in to ensure these objectives . . . .”24 
Both of them may contribute to the fact that they may encourage states to 
improve the effectiveness of their national justice system compatible with 
the interest of the international society.  
 
Amongst other reasons, Benzing raises the question whether the Court is an 
institution entrusted with the protection of human rights of the accused in 
the national enforcement of the international justice. He primarily affirms 
that that mandate is expressly provided in the complementarity principle as 
defined by articles 17 to 19.
25
 In this respect, article 17 stipulates, in 
determining whether a state is unwilling to prosecute, the Court shall have 
regard to the “principles of due process recognized by international law.” He 
asks, “whether the Court could theoretically step in and declare a case 
admissible if a state fervently and overzealously prosecutes war criminals 
with blatant disregard for the fair trial rights of the accused.”26 This question 
could also be asked in relation to political prisoners in case of a regime 
change
27
. If the answer is yes, the ICC can or shall take action; therefore, the 
principle of complementarity would require the Court to step in where the 
situation in the state concerned leads to a breach of the human rights of the 
accused. Should the accused be protected from the victor’s justice? “Could 
be said yes, he must be protected,” Nserko responds28. Furthermore, Holmes 
argues that the original purpose behind the inclusion of the factors of lack of 
                                                 
22
 Rome Statute Article 5:  
“The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this 
Statute with respect to the following crimes: 
(a) The crime of genocide; 
(b) Crimes against humanity; 
(c) War crimes; 
(d) The crime of aggression.” 
23
 Markus Benzing, The Complementarity Regime Of the International Criminal Court: 
International Criminal Justice between State Sovereignty and the Fight against Impunity, 
Max Plank Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 7, 2003, 597 
24
 Ibid 
25
 Benzing, Supra note 23, page 597 
26
 Benzing, Supra note 23, page 597 
27
 This matter will be discussed in the second section of the thesis regarding Saif Al-Islam 
Qaddafi 
28
 D.D. Ntanda Nseresko, “The International Criminal Court: Jurisdictional and Related 
Issues,” Criminal Law Forum 10 (1999), 116 
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independence and impartiality in article 17(2) (C) was to relate procedural 
fairness and due process
29
.  
 
In the end, Benzing poses this question, “Were the principle of 
complementary designed to cover such situations?” He eventually rejects 
that the court shall step in
30
. He further elaborates the answer by referring to 
Fife that the ICC was not created as a human rights court stricto sensu.
31
 
While article 17(2) refers to the principles of “due process recognized by 
international law,,” he concludes that this principle has been established to 
address situations “where a miscarriage of justice and breach of human 
rights standards works in favor of the accused and he or she profits from the 
irregularity by evading a just determination of his or her responsibility.”32 
As an example to underpin his argument, he had a recourse to the Statute of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter 
ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR) 
both of which apply in the same way regarding the ne bis in idem
33
. He 
confirms that “where there is an inconsistency of national proceedings with 
standards of a fair trial exceptionally allows the Tribunals to exercise 
jurisdiction in a ne bis in idem situation only if the defendant benefited from 
such deviations.”34 
 
In response to the argument that the Court is not designed to protect the 
rights of the accused, it would be helpful to draw upon the Rome Statute 
articles that the Court shall apply in the first place according to article 21 
(1).
 35
 First, it is entirely at the discretion of the Court to determine a case 
admissible
36
. Second, general principles of interpretation, specifically article 
31 of VCLT, affirms that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”  However, no 
good faith may be assumed in interpreting the provision not in favor of the 
accused.  
 
                                                 
29
 J. T Holmes, “complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in A. Cassese/ P. Gaeta/ 
J.R.W.D , The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, 2002, 
Vol. 1, 676 
30
 Benzing, supra note 23, 598 
31
 R.E. Fife, “The International Criminal Court Whence it Came, Where It Goes,” Nord. J. 
Int’l L. 69 (2000), 72, Fife also point out that this does not mean that the work of the court 
may not lead to an increase in human rights protection and that the Court is not obliged to 
respect human rights when it is operating itself; Benzing, Supra note 23, 598 
32
 Benzing, Supra note 23, 598, Footnote omitted 
33
 Article 10 (2) of ICTY and article 9 (2) of the ICTR:   
“A person who has been tried by a national court for acts constituting serious violations of 
international humanitarian law may be subsequently tried by the International Tribunal only 
if: (a) the act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary crime; or (b) 
the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, were designed to shield 
the accused from international criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently 
prosecuted.” 
34
 Benzing, Supra note 23, 598; Also see 1.2.2.5.1 “due process in international law” 
35
 Rome Statute, Article 21 (1) 
36
 Rome Statute, Article 17 (1) 
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Moreover, maybe it is possible to claim that the Court per se has not been 
created as a court of human rights, but the Rome Statute itself asserts that 
the “interpretation of the articles must be consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights."
37
 That is to say, even when the human rights of 
the accused is being fervently violated, the Court may rely upon this 
interpretation, extend its jurisdiction and step in even if it is said that the 
Court is not a court of human rights. To elaborate more, it should be pointed 
out that article 17 (2) provides situations, inter alia, that where there is an 
“unjustified delay” in prosecuting the accused, the case becomes admissible 
before the Court. This is positively in favor of the Accused
38
. Regarding 
other forms of the violation of the human rights of the accused in the hands 
of the state that has jurisdiction over the case, some authors believe that in 
such a situation, the Court may either rely upon the “inability” of the state 
concerned
39
 or the “unwillingness” of the state, considering both the 
chapeau of article 17 (2), with “regard to the principles of “due process 
recognized in international law” and the reference to “lack of independence 
and impartiality” in article 17 (2) (c).40 
 
Therefore, it is possible for the Court to rely upon the above-mentioned 
interpretation to declare a case admissible where the rights of the accused 
have been violated even though it was considered not to address human 
rights violations of the accused. 
 
In conclusion, it may be stated that the principle of complementarity has 
been adopted to strike a gentle balance between the state sovereignty to 
exercise jurisdiction and the realization that, for the effective prevention of 
such crimes and impunity, the international community has to step in to 
ensure these objectives and retain its credibility in the pursuance of these 
crimes
41
. The principle also brings about and supplements the idea of an 
“effective decentralized prosecution of international crimes42. Also 
regarding the rights of the accused, and the ICC jurisdiction, there is no 
clear-cut answer to that since this issue has not been dealt with by the Court. 
But as we observed, there is this potential legal possibility added to human 
rights normative values for the Court to render a case admissible even if the 
intrinsic rights of the accused is being violated, which seems also much 
                                                 
37
 Rome Statute, Article 21 (3) 
38
 See 1.2.2.5.3 “unjustified delay” 
39See Kevin John Heller, “The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The effect of Article 17 
of the Rome Statute on the Principle of Due Process,” Criminal Law Forum (2006), 5; 
Article 17(3) provides in full:  
‘‘In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due 
to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is 
unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable 
to carry out its proceedings.’’ 
40
 Ibid. Also see 1.2.2.5.1 “due process in international law” 
41
 See S.A. Williams, “article 17”, in: Otto Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court”: Observers’ notes, Article by Article, 1999, 
MN 20, Also Benzing, supra note 23, page 600. 
42
 See R. Wolfrum, “The Decentralized Prosecution of International Offences through 
National Courts” in Benzing, supra note 23 “The ICC Complementarity Regime”, Page 
600. 
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more compatible with article 21 (3) of the Rome Statute. As to the 
application of the article 21 (3) which certainly plays a significant role in the 
ICC interpretation of the Rome Statute provisions, it appears that the ICC 
endorses the application of the human rights norms in interpreting according 
to this article. The ICC appeals chamber in Lubanga decision affirmed that  
 
“Article 21 (3) of the Statute stipulates that the law applicable under 
the Statute must be interpreted as well as applied in accordance with 
internationally recognized human rights. Human rights underpin the 
Statute; every aspect of it, including the exercise of the jurisdiction 
of the Court. Its provisions must be interpreted and more importantly 
applied in accordance with internationally recognized human 
rights.”43 
 
Therefore, there is a confident space for the court in interpretation of the 
Statute in accordance with internationally recognized human rights.
44
 
 
 
1.2.2- Admissibility 
 
The preamble of the Rome Statute and article 1 assert that the International 
Criminal Court shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction
45
. It 
was mentioned above that the complementarity principle was agreed upon 
before even the conference took place.
46
 Reflection on the assertion of the 
complementarity principle in the preamble and then the duplicative in article 
1 and articles 17 to 19 (operative provisions of the Statute) indicates the 
fundamental importance that states have attached to it
47
. 
 
As the preamble and article one introduce the complementarity regime, they 
do not provide any clear legal relationship between national criminal 
jurisdiction and the ICC; how does this relationship work and when does a 
case become admissible? Consequently, article 17 was embedded to provide 
situations according to which a case is inadmissible. This article enumerates 
four conditions that will be discussed in the next sub-sections. 
 
Article 17(1) asserts:  
 
                                                 
43
 The e Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo , ICC-01/04-01/06-772, Judgment on the 
Appeal of Mr. The omas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to 
the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute, 3 October 2006 (14 
December 2006), Para. 37 
44
 This particular matter may refer to the question of the scope of the application of this 
paragraph in article 21. In fact this research is not seeking to actually examine this question, 
in spite of the fact that there is a strong nexus between the questions that this research is 
seeking to respond. The author has found the Court’s assertion in Lubanga decision quite 
decisive, even though, he still believes that this this matter requires a thorough examination. 
45
 Preamble of the Rome Statute, paragraph 10: Emphasizing that the International Criminal 
Court established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions, 
46
 See sub-heading “complementarity jurisdiction and admissibility” 
47
 Kleffner, Supra note 19, page 99 
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Having regard to paragraph 10 of the preamble and article 1 the 
Court shall determine a case is inadmissible where: 
 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State 
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or 
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute 
the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; 
 
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct 
which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court 
is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3; 
 
(d) The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action 
by the Court. 
 
 
 
1.2.2.1- The Case Is Being Investigated or Prosecuted Genuinely, Article 17 
(1) (a) 
 
A case becomes inadmissible where an investigation or prosecution is being 
processed. This is the first ground by which the Court shall determine the 
admissibility of a case. Perhaps this ground is the most important and 
controversial among these four. The reason could be that the state is 
processing the investigation or prosecution. Then, the assessment is not over 
an outcome of the state’s act but a process that either has not been started or 
has been started by default. Another reason might be the fact that acquiring 
information from the states that are not party to the Rome Statute may be 
extremely difficult where the State does not have the intention to cooperate 
with the Court. Sudan is a typical example of this. The state can simply 
claim that it is investigating the case and assessment of the credibility of this 
claim, unsurprisingly, seems exhausting and difficult. The article reads as: 
 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely 
to carry out the investigation or prosecution; 
 
Considering the wording of article 17(1) (a), it applies where an 
investigation is being initiated but it is proved that the state is unwilling or 
unable to carry out the proceedings in a good faith. That is to say, as long as 
the national court is taking appropriate and effective steps then it does not 
trigger the Court’s jurisdiction unless the prosecutor proves otherwise by 
relying on the state’s “unwillingness” or “inability” to carry out the 
investigation genuinely. There are some considerations regarding the 
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wording of the article, which are vague. The phrase “the case is being 
investigated or prosecuted” which is referred in the first part of the article 
implies that initial steps have been taken. 
 
It should, however, be noted that at the initial stages of an investigation the 
contour of a case is relatively vague. Often no individual has been identified 
in this stage. As indicated by the Pre-Trial Chamber I in the case against 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, a “case” is defined by “the specific incidents during 
which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court seem to have 
been committed by one or more identified individuals.”48 
 
In another decision, the ICC asserted that a case is defined “by the warrant 
of arrest or summons to appear issued under article 58, or the charges 
brought by the Prosecutor and confirmed by the Pre-trial Chamber under 
article 61.”49 Article 58 requires that for a warrant of arrest or a summons to 
appear to be issued, there must be “reasonable grounds” to believe that the 
person named therein has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court
50
.  
 
Consequently, the Court, by drawing upon the wording of article 17 (1) (c) 
and 20 (3), concludes that the defining elements of a concrete “case” before 
the Court are the individual and the alleged conduct. Then it follows that  
 
“[f]or such a case to be inadmissible under article 17 (1) (a) of the 
Statute, the national investigation must cover the same individual and 
substantially the same conduct as alleged in the proceedings before the 
Court.”51 
 
As a result, for the purposes of defining a “case,” national investigations 
“must cover the same conduct” which requires that those investigations 
must also cover the same persons subject to the Court's proceedings. 
However, at the situation stage, the reference to the groups of persons is 
                                                 
48
 See Decision on the Application for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, 
VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, 17 January 2006, ICC 01/04-101, Para. 65 
49
 Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled "Decision on the Application by the Government of 
Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the 
Statute, ICC-01/09-01/11-307, Para 40 
50
 Article 58 (1): 
“At any time after the initiation of an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the 
application of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant of arrest of a person if, having examined the 
application and the evidence or other information submitted by the Prosecutor, it is satisfied 
that: (a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court; and (b) The arrest of the person appears necessary: (i) 
To ensure the person's appearance at trial; (ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or 
endanger the investigation or the court proceedings; or (iii) Where applicable, to prevent 
the person from continuing with the commission of that crime or a related crime which is 
within the jurisdiction of the Court and which arises out of the same circumstances.” 
51
 Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled "Decision on the Application by the Government of 
Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the 
Statute, ICC-01/09-01/11-307, Para 40 
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mainly to broaden the test, because at the preliminary stage of an 
investigation into the situation, it is unlikely to have an identified suspect
52
. 
Thus, it should be kept in mind that the national system must investigate the 
same conduct and the same person as the ICC in case there is an identified 
suspect by the ICC. Reverse inference or contario interpretation from the 
above-mentioned definition of a “case” would lead us to the conclusion that 
if the state is not investigating the same person for the same conduct, then it 
is not carrying out an investigation or prosecution. Accordingly, the case 
would be rendered admissible before the ICC. 
 
The second consideration or vagueness of article 17 (1) (a) is the initiation 
of an investigation or the assessment of the existence of an active 
investigation by the state that has jurisdiction over the case. First, the word 
investigation has been defined within the jurisprudence of the Court. In the 
Kenya decision regarding the admissibility of its challenge to the Court, the 
Appeals Chamber defined investigation as 
 
“Taking of steps directed at ascertaining whether this individual is 
responsible for that conduct, for instance by interviewing witnesses or 
suspects, collecting documentary evidence or carrying out forensic 
analysis.”53 
 
Furthermore, the mere assertion of the state that has jurisdiction over the 
case does not satisfy the Court in rendering a case inadmissible. In fact, the 
Court requires the investigation to be of probative value. In the Kenya 
decision on the challenge to the admissibility of the Court, in response to 
Kenya’s claim that it is actively investigating the case, the Court expressed 
that, 
 
A statement by a Government that it is actively investigating is not [...] 
determinative. In such a case, the Government must support its 
statement with tangible proof to demonstrate that it is actually carrying 
out relevant investigations. In other words, there must be evidence with 
probative value.
54
  
 
However, a question might be asked: If a state does not have the same 
criminal qualification for the conduct and for the same person, should the 
ICC consider the case admissible? In other word, if the state is investigating 
the same person for a bundle of ordinary crimes, does that deter the ICC 
from exercising jurisdiction? In order to answer this question, it should be 
kept in mind that the ICC may investigate certain crimes, only within their 
context – particularly crimes against humanity and genocide – with their 
                                                 
52
 Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility 
of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute, 30 May 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-101, 
Para 53-53  
53
 Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled 'Decision on the Application by the Government of 
Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the 
Statute, ICC-01/09-02/11-307,30 August 2011, par. 1. 
54
 Ibid, Para. 62 
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specific elements of crime, and taking into consideration all circumstances 
that are connected with the commission of the said crimes.  
 
Accordingly, it can be inferred that when a committed crime does not meet 
its statutory elements of crime, it is not within the jurisdiction of the court. 
For example, the ordinary crime of murder is not within the jurisdiction of 
the Court. That maybe the reason why the forth ground of article 17 requires 
a case to be of sufficient gravity to be declared admissible where other 
elements exist. Conversely, modes of liability envisaged in the Rome 
Statute are not consistent with those of ordinary crimes. Therefore, if a state 
criminal code does not contain crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, it 
is simply lacking suppression of the international crimes and consequently 
the ICC should exercise jurisdiction over those crimes. In this regard, 
paragraph 2 article 9 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court for 
Rwanda (hereinafter ICTR) states that,  
 
“A person who has been tried before a national court for acts 
constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law may be 
subsequently tried by the International Tribunal for Rwanda only if: (a) 
The act for which he or she was tried was characterized as an ordinary 
crime.”55 
 
Furthermore, in the Bagaragaza case, the ICTR asserts that 
 
“According to this statutory provision, the Tribunal may still try a 
person who has been tried before a national court for “acts 
constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law” if 
the acts for which he or she was tried were “categorized as an 
ordinary crime.” Furthermore, the protected legal values are 
different. The penalization of genocide protects specifically defined 
groups, whereas the penalization of homicide protects individual 
lives.”56 
 
The practice of the ICC should also be taken into account. In DRC 
admissibility decision, the PTC I required the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) to investigate not only against the same alleged perpetrator in 
the same region as the Prosecutor, but also the same crimes. Consequently, 
the court approved the admissibility of the case before the ICC, because the 
DRC did not investigate Thomas Lubanga for the war crime of conscripting 
or enlisting children into the national armed forces.
57
  
 
In addition, it is observed that there is different interest between the crimes 
of an international character and crimes of national character. However, 
                                                 
55
 ICTR Statute, article 9 (2) 
56
 ICTR, Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-05-86-AR11bis, Decision on Rule 
11bis Appeal, Aug. 30, 2006. Para 17 
57
 See Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58, 10 
February 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-8-US-Corr, Paras 37-39; See also Prosecutor’s 
Submission of Further Information and Materials, ICC-01/04-01/06-39-US-AnxC, Para. 18, 
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there are still authors who ambivalently assert that solely a lack of specific 
provision for dealing with crimes of an international character is not enough 
to render a case admissible before the Court. The Court shall take into 
consideration other factors too.
58
 Obviously, regular crimes do not bear any 
interest to international concerns and universal values, and thus it does not 
meet one of the purposes of the Rome Statute to address crimes of 
international concerns. 
 
Noticeably, although state parties to the Rome Statute are obligated to enact 
provisions that criminalize international crimes according to their domestic 
regulations, this might be the case regarding the non-state parties to the 
Rome Statute. They do not have such responsibility and therefore, even if 
they are prosecuting the same person for alternative criminal qualification 
such as murder, it is not the same conduct as of those crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, so this might elevate the ICC jurisdiction. Perhaps, 
owing to the fact that states may bring admissibility challenges in every 
stage, it would be an important strategy to reform their criminal code or 
regulate them in a separate provision. 
 
 
 
1.2.2.2- The Case Has Been Investigated or Prosecuted Genuinely, Article 
17 (1) (b) 
 
Article 17(1) (b) describes another situation in which a given case becomes 
admissible. Unlike the first paragraph, which is about a case that is being 
investigated, article 17(1) (b) takes a step forward and discusses the 
situation after an investigation. According to this paragraph, a prosecution 
has been done by a state that has jurisdiction over the crime and decided not 
to prosecute, [….the state has decided not to prosecute…] unless this 
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the state to prosecute 
genuinely. According to the wording of the paragraph, two cumulative 
conditions are required: First, the case must have been investigated. Second, 
a decision not to prosecute must have been taken. It should, however, be 
noted that when a state decides not to prosecute and this decision has 
resulted from inability, the case becomes admissible, and it falls outside the 
provision of article 17(1) (b). It rather falls within the scope of article 17 (3). 
In this regard, in the Bemba decision, where the state of Central African 
Republic left the prosecution voluntarily, the ICC asserted that this case 
does not satisfy one of the requirements of article 17(1) (b) in the sense that 
there has not been a decision not to prosecute the accused person, but the 
CAR stated that they do not have the ability to endure the investigation
59
.  It 
seems that the CAR itself relinquished its jurisdiction from the case rather 
than making a decision not to prosecute the person concerned. 
 
 
                                                 
58
 Kleffner, supra note 19, 122-123, 156- 157 
59
 Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor V. John Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, judgment of 24 June 2010, ICC-01/05-01/08-802, Para 74-75 
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1.2.2.3- Exception to the Principle Double Jeopardy, Article 17 (1) (c)   
 
In the third place in article 17, the principle of ne bis in idem has been made 
relevant to the third paragraph, which is incorporated in Article 20(3). This 
principle is recognized widely in international law. It is also recognized as 
the prohibition of double jeopardy which is defined in article 20 (3) of the 
Statute as well. However, the Statute provides exceptions by which a person 
might be tried before the ICC twice, where the proceedings is merely for the 
purpose of shielding the person for committing crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC
60
 or where the trial has not been or is not being 
conducted by an independent or an impartial court in accordance with the 
norms of due process recognized by international law or were the trial is 
conducted in a manner which in the circumstances are inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
61.” These two exceptions 
quite resemble the two conditions of unwillingness defined in article 17(2) 
(a) and (c). About the first paragraph, it may be inferred from the wording, 
that the requirement of ‘same person same conduct’ must be met by 
considering “crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC,” and that the 
elements of the crimes must exist just as they are defined in the Statute
62
. 
Article 20(3) prohibits the ICC from trying the person for the same conduct, 
which means that the ICC may conduct a trial for crimes other than those 
that have national proceedings. Here, it is worth noting that lack of the 
specific provisions of the Rome Statute may result in the admissibility of a 
case according to article 17(1) (c) and 20(3). Consequently, the case may 
fall outside the ambit of the prohibition of the principle of double jeopardy. 
 
 
1.2.2.4-Sufficient Gravity, Article 17(1) (d) 
 
The final ground for the admissibility of a case before the court is the 
ambiguous, controversial phrase “sufficient gravity.” If a case is not of 
sufficient gravity, it is inadmissible
63
. This is controversial because the 
words “sufficient gravity” has not been defined. In fact, it does not seem 
possible to be defined. Thus, it entirely falls within the ambit of the Court 
and the prosecutor to determine a case of sufficient gravity. Qualitative and 
quantitative elements need to be considered though
64
. According to the trial 
chamber in the case of Cote de Ivory, several factors concerning sentencing 
as reflected in rule 145(1) (c)
65
 and (2) (b) (IV)
66
 could provide useful 
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 The Rome Statute article 20 (3) (a) 
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64
  Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
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guidance in such an examination. These factors could be summarized as: (i) 
the scale of the alleged crimes (including assessment of geographical and 
temporal intensity); (ii) the nature of the unlawful behaviour or of the crimes 
allegedly committed; (iii) the employed means for the execution of the 
crimes (i.e., the manner of their commission); and (iv) the impact of the 
crimes and the harm caused to victims and their families
67
. 
 
Four grounds of admissibility have been discussed above; however, even if 
the respective state does investigate or prosecute the case, it must not be 
“unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution.” The notions of “unwillingness” and “inability” are the 
crucial—and most problematic— requirements of Art. 17(1) (a) and (b). 
These two notions will be analysed below: 
 
 
1.2.2.5- Unwillingness 
 
As it is referred to in article 17(1), unwillingness is defined further in a 
separate paragraph in the same article. It provides that:  
 
‘[i]n order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court 
shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process 
recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following 
exist, as applicable: 
 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the 
national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the 
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5; 
 
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings 
which in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to 
bring the person concerned to justice; 
 
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted 
independently or impartially, and they were or are being 
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice.’  
 
                                                                                                                            
consideration, inter alia, to the extent of the damage caused, in particular the harm caused 
to the victims and their families, the nature of the unlawful behavior and the means 
employed to execute the crime; the degree of participation of the convicted person; the 
degree of intent; the circumstances of manner, time and location; and the age, education, 
social and economic condition of the convicted person” 
66
 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 145 (2) (b) (iv): 
“Commission of the crime with particular cruelty or where there were multiple victims” 
67
 Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 3 October 2011, Para 62 
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The question that should be taken into account in advance is whether the list 
is exhaustive. In this regard, the Statute itself does not clarify, but owing to 
the lack of a clarifying phrase such as “inter alia” or “including” or “but not 
limited to,,” as used in article 90(6) and 90(7), it can be deduced that the list 
is exhaustive
68
.  
 
Nonetheless, in a practical view, for the court and the purpose of the Statute 
to put an end to impunity, the list should not be granted as exhaustive. It has 
been observed that the phrase was introduced to ensure that the court uses 
objective criteria in its consideration of national proceedings
69
. 
 
The principle of “due process recognized under international law” should be 
considered by the court in the first place, and then the Court shall assess if 
one of the criteria has been met. Those criteria are proceedings for 
“shielding” a person from an “unjustified delay” and the “lack of 
independence and impartiality” of the judiciary. It, nevertheless, seems that 
this principle has been conceived as it were in international law and 
international conventions. In a close examination of the article, it may be 
said that, even though it was mentioned that the Court is not a human rights 
court
70
, which it is not, the Statute is greatly concerned about human rights 
standards of the right to a fair trial. Owing to the fact that the court does not 
provide a definition of ‘due process,’ applicable rules according to the 
Statute are importantly relevant. Article 21, set out that the Court shall 
apply, in the first place, the rules of the Statute; elements of crimes; and 
rules of procedure and evidence; and in the second place, applicable treaties 
and principles and rules of international law
71
. Therefore, it provides the 
authority for the court to draw up international human rights conventions in 
this respect. Furthermore, in the interpretation of law pursuant to article 
21(3) must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights
72
. 
The extent of the application of “due process” in the assessment of 
unwillingness is of great importance, and it seems that minimum standards 
of human rights must be taken into account. However, as the Statute 
provides a list in article 17(2), it is beneficial to have a better understanding 
from the terms that are used in that article. Each term will be analysed 
below: 
 
 
 
1.2.2.5.1- Due process in international law 
 
We observe that paragraph 2 of article 17 requires the Court to determine 
the willingness of a State by regarding “due process recognized in 
international law” in order to assess whether one or more of the provided 
situations exist.  
                                                 
68
 Benzing, Supra note 23, page 606, footnote omitted 
69
 J. T. Holmes, Supra Note 29, page 53-54 
70
 See 1.2.1 “Rationale of complementarity” 
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 Rome Statute, Article 21  
72
 Rome Statute, Article 21 (3) 
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In the first place, we should know what these principles actually are. Neither 
the Statute itself, nor travaux perpetarious elucidate the intention of drafters 
when including the notion principles of due process in the article.
73
 In 
international law, matter of due process has been dealt with under principles 
of fair trial
74
. Fair trial is constituted of various rights, rules and principles 
such as the independence and impartiality of judiciaries, the right to be tried 
without undue delay, or various rights presumed for the accused. However, 
the reference in article 17 (2) is not to right to a fair trial but rather to due 
process and, importantly, those rights shall be understood in the notion of 
unwillingness. 
 
From the work of the drafters, it has been illustrated that the phrase “due 
process recognized in international law” was to ensure that the Court uses 
objective criteria in its consideration of national procedures. First, it was 
meant to apply to the criteria in article 17 (2) (c), which is the 
“independence and impartiality of the judiciary,” and later it was agreed to 
include it in the chapeau of article 17 (2) and apply it to all paragraphs.
75
 
The formula of article 17 (2) is unclear and needs to be elucidated. 
 
Prior to the analysis of the grounds of unwillingness, a controversial 
question should be answered in regard to the due process: Should a case be 
considered as admissible under article 17 if the court determines that the 
state claiming jurisdiction over the situation will not provide the defendant 
with due process and consequently renders a state “unwilling”? This 
question was considered in examining the rationale of the complementarity 
of the Rome Statute. 
 
In this regard, Kevin John Heller, in his article where he discusses the effect 
of article 17 of the Rome Statute on national due process, responds that: 
 
“The overwhelming consensus among international criminal law 
scholars is that the answer is ‘yes.’ Indeed, I have not found a single 
scholar writing in English who does not accept the due process thesis.”76 
 
He further relies upon Mark Ellis as an emblematic remark in that field: 
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“The following statement is emblematic: If states desire to retain control 
over prosecuting nationals charged with crimes under the ICC Statute, 
they must ensure that their own judicial systems meet international 
standards. At a minimum, states will have to adhere to standards of due 
process found in international human rights instruments, particularly as 
they relate to the rights of defendants.”77 
 
Some authors also, in explaining the nexus between “due process” and 
“unwillingness” of a state, focus on the language of “impartiality and 
independence” of the court. Bossiouni, for example, argues that ‘the Court 
will determine that the state is unwilling to genuinely investigate or 
prosecute if…. the proceedings are not conducted independently and 
impartially.’78 
 
In addition, other authors refer to the chapeau of article 17 (2) that it 
requires the Court in determining “unwillingness” of a State to have “regard 
to the principle of due process recognized in international law.” In this 
respect Carsten Starn argues that the reference suggest that even alternative 
forms of justice must guarantee basic fair trial rights to the accused in the 
procedure
79
.  
 
Moreover, there are scholars that have argued that a state is ‘unable’ to 
investigate or prosecute if it does not guarantee the defendant due process
80
. 
This is similar to the position that the authors of the Informal Expert Papers 
of the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC have taken. According to that 
paper, the Court shall take into account a state’s ‘legal regime of due 
process standards, rights of accused and procedures when determining 
whether it is able to investigate and prosecute.
81
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To support the above mentioned idea, aside from the scholars, the text of 
Rule 51 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence is perceptible that may be 
considered as one of the grounds that the Court may rely on. Rule 51 reads 
as:  
 
“In considering the matters referred to in article 17, paragraph 2, and in 
the context of the circumstances of the case, the Court may consider, 
inter alia, information that the state referred to in article 17, paragraph 1, 
may choose to bring to the attention of the Court showing that its courts 
meet internationally recognized norms and standards for the independent 
and impartial prosecution of similar conduct, or that the State has 
confirmed in writing to the Prosecutor that the case is being investigated 
or prosecuted.” 
 
On the other hand, it was argued earlier in discussing the rationality of 
complementarity that the Court is not a human rights court per se
82
, so it 
cannot address the human rights violations of the defendant in a given case. 
This is however one of the criticisms of the due process thesis. Here, it is 
worth mentioning that it was concluded by the author in the previous 
chapter that the Court is not a Court of human rights but it does not seem 
right to turn a blind eye on this particular matter
83
 owing to the fact that it 
tremendously impairs the ability and impartiality and independence of the 
State’s judicial system. Furthermore, any interpretation of the terms, 
according to paragraph 3, article 21 shall be compatible with the norms of 
human rights law, to which leaving the defendant at the discretion of 
national proceedings which breach his/her rights does not seem compatible 
at all. 
 
While it has been argued that the due process thesis, as it was called by 
Heller, is supported by scholars, there are also grounds for criticising it. 
Grounds such as the contradiction of the due process thesis with the text, 
context and history of article 17 have been enumerated.
 84
 As to the practice 
of the Court, so far, it does not contain clear statements that could let us 
know where it stands on this particular issue. 
 
In conclusion, a multitude of international criminal law scholars uncritically 
agrees that the principle of complementarity is applicable to all questions of 
a due process.
85
 Most of these scholars believe that an unfair process would 
reflect the unwillingness to investigate genuinely. For this, they focus on 
two different legal aspects:  the notion of “independently or impartially” in 
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Art 17(2) (c) of the ICC Statute;
86
 and the phrase “having regard to 
principles of due process recognized by international law” in Art 17(2).87 
Some commentators also believe that a State, which cannot guarantee a due 
process, is “unable” to investigate. This view is shared, e.g., by the authors 
of the Informal Expert Paper
88
. This view is highly consistent with the 
nature of human rights norms and principles. Even though some argue that 
the Court is not a Court of human rights per se, it still is interconnected with 
human right principles as mentioned above. 
 
It was asserted that 17 (2) requires the Court to determine the willingness of 
a state by considering “due process recognized in international law” in order 
to assess whether one or more of the provided situations exist. Each of those 
situations will be discussed below.  
 
 
1.2.2.5.2- Shielding the Person Concerned 
 
The first form of unwillingness spelled out in article 17 (2) is whether the 
proceedings were or are being undertaken or whether the national decision 
was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal 
responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred in 
article 5 of the Rome Statute.
89
 Proof of a purpose of shielding is required. 
This is a high threshold since the devious intent of the state needs to be 
proved. There must be causality between the state’s purpose and the 
inadequate procedural step. In order to determine a “purpose of shielding” 
provided by article 17 (2) (a), the prosecutor must prove a devious intent on 
the part of a state in contradiction to its apparent action.
90
 A question may 
arise: What should be done if the state is investigating the alleged 
perpetrator solely for the purpose of deterring the ICC jurisdiction. In this 
regard, it should be mentioned that according to Paragraphs 4, 6 and 10 of 
the Preamble of the Rome Statute as well as articles 1 and 17, it has been 
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desirable that the state take over the Case and exercise jurisdiction over the 
alleged perpetrators. Therefore, to establish a purpose of shielding, it is not 
sufficient to find out that the state concerned has exercised jurisdiction and 
initiated proceedings for the sole purpose of preventing the Court from 
acting since this is not only permissible but also desirable by the Rome 
Statute’s complementarity regime.91 
 
What remains important and difficult to prove is the intent of the state, 
which is an abstract entity. How can the mind-set of an abstract entity, such 
as a state, be determined? Indeed, the context and the conduct of the state 
are decisive. In exceptional cases, the purpose of shielding may be 
established due to express statements or clearly manifested actions such as 
blanket self-amnesties following initial investigatory steps of the relevant 
national authorities.
92
 However, in the absence of such direct proof, the 
‘devious intent on the part of the state, contrary to its apparent actions’93 has 
to be inferred from objective and circumstantial evidence. In these cases, a 
question arises as to what indicators may constitute such circumstantial 
evidence. Rule 51 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence allows the Court 
to consider ‘inter alia, information that the state referred to in article 17, 
paragraph 1, may choose to bring to the attention of the Court showing that 
its courts meet internationally recognized norms and standards for the 
independent and impartial prosecution of similar conduct, or that the state 
has confirmed in writing to the Prosecutor that the case is being investigated 
or prosecuted.’94 It was mentioned earlier that this information can be 
considered by the Court in in general and the court is not confined to doing 
so in the context of shieling. 
95
 
 
In sum, about the first form of unwillingness, shielding, the intent of the 
state plays a key role, which may be inferred from objective circumstantial 
evidence or from the devious intent of the state that is contrary to its 
apparent action. Moreover, the initiation of proceedings for the sole purpose 
of deterring the ICC jurisdiction does not amount to shielding since this is 
desirable under the Rome Statute and the complementarity regime. 
 
1.2.2.5.3- Unjustified Delay 
 
Paragraph 2 states one of the situations through which in the light of the due 
process recognized in international law, one could prove the unwillingness 
of a State where there is an unjustified delay. A “delay,” for the purposes of 
article 17(2) (b), encompasses proceedings which have taken longer than 
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other similar proceedings in the state concerned.
96
 Moreover, this 
“unjustified delay” must be “inconsistent with the intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice.” In fact, the paragraph encompasses three 
requirements. There must be, first, a “delay” in the proceedings, and second, 
such a delay has to be “unjustified,” and that unjustified delay, third, has to 
be “inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.” 
Unlike “shielding,” for which essential existence of causality between the 
intent of the state and shielding the alleged perpetrator was required to be 
proved by the prosecution, here the mere presence of inconsistency with a 
bona fide investigation or prosecution is enough.
97
 Therefore, these 
elements need to be taken into account. 
 
In order to determine that when a delay is unjustified, there are related 
jurisprudence of human rights bodies that might be helpful: jurisprudence 
on the right to be tried “without undue delay”98 and to a hearing ‘within a 
reasonable time’99 in the determination of criminal charges as well as the 
right to such a hearing in the determination of one’s civil rights and 
obligations
100
 can be exemplified. As kleffner rightly put it, these notions 
are different with the wording of article 17 (2) (b) and “human rights 
provisions cannot be simply transplanted” in the Rome Statute. 
Nevertheless, he further asserts that “notwithstanding the differences in 
wording to article 17(2) (b) […] there is considerable overlap between the 
notions of an ‘unjustified delay’ and hearings ‘within a reasonable time.’ 
For, when interpreting these human rights norms, supervisory organs assess 
whether there have been justifications for a delay in deciding that a delay 
was ‘undue’ or that a hearing was not held ‘within a reasonable time.”101 
Furthermore, as to the history of the preparatory work the drafters of the 
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Statute replaced the term ‘undue,’ which appeared in earlier drafts of the 
provision which later became Article 17 (2)(b), with ‘unjustified’ during the 
Rome Conference because the notion of ‘undue delay’ was seen as being too 
low a threshold for unwillingness.
102
 
 
It was already noted that an unjustified delay would be, in the 
circumstances, inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice. Here again, as was required in ‘shielding’, the state of mind of the 
state and the evaluation of the intention of the state come to attention. In this 
regard, as already noted above, the scholars are of the view that in contrast 
to ‘shielding,’ the prosecutor has to illustrate that the “unjustified delay” is 
inconsistence with the intent to bring the person concerned to justice, rather 
than prove the causality between the intent of the state and shielding the 
alleged perpetrator
103
. 
 
In addition, the justifiability of every case shall be determined according to 
the circumstances of every case and it should be decided on a case-by-case 
basis
104
. It should, however, be taken into consideration that a delay shall be 
illegitimate under the present circumstances. Therefore, the complexity of a 
case or an investigation may not be considered as unjustified even though 
that might take longer than a regular investigation and proceedings. 
Nevertheless, any assessment shall be taken into account according to the 
circumstances on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Another point is that, where a state purports that it is investigating or 
prosecuting the person concerned, but it even fails to demonstrate the 
existence of a proceedings, Hall contends that this might be viewed as a 
“delay,”105  if the existence of an investigation is taken for granted of 
course. It should be noted that this is only the case when national 
proceedings exist; otherwise, the case is automatically admissible due to 
national inaction.
106
 
 
The last but not least observation regarding article 17 (2) (b) has been well 
pointed out by Kleffner. He asserts in his final observation of article 17 (2) 
(b) that this paragraph “is an exception to the general assumption underlying 
article 17 (2) as a whole.” Noticeably, it “focuses on violations of due 
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process to the advantage rather than disadvantage” of the alleged 
perpetrator.
107
 He further elaborates and concludes that 
 
“Article 17 (2)(b) seems susceptible to an interpretation that does not 
only cover situations in which delays in the proceedings are intended 
to protect the accused from criminal responsibility, as in the case of 
shielding. Rather, the provision would equally seem to extend to 
those situations in which unjustified delays work to his or her 
detriment. Thus a strong argument can be made that delays in the 
proceedings against persons suspected of having committed core 
crimes that are left in a limbo for years, without any indication that 
they will be tried, could fall under Article 17 (2) (b) and thus render 
cases admissible, because they are unjustified and inconsistent with 
an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”108 
 
Moreover, one may question the measurement of the unjustified delay. It is 
argued that it must be done with comparison to the usual procedures and 
time frames in each individual state
109
. It also may comply with respect to 
state sovereignty, which is the core of the complementarity principle. 
Although some suggested that there should be a regulated time for all states, 
this does not seem likely due to the diversity of the states, their current 
resources, and their development status. In order to do a thorough 
examination of whether the delay is unjustified, the Court may take into 
account the judicial reputation of the state concerned as well. Moreover, the 
delay must be illegitimate. As an instance, if the delay is due to compliance 
with human rights standard, it simply cannot be considered unjustified
110
.  
 
There has not been a single case in the ICC concerning an unjustified delay 
and the question of whether it works in favour of the accused or not. 
However, Kleffner’s interpretation does seem reasonable. The accused 
cannot be left for an indefinite time in prison or any unfavourable situation 
in contradiction with his/her rights. Moreover, this has an explicit nexus 
with the capacity and the capability of a judicial system of a state. Under 
article 4 of the ICCPR in which non-derogable rights are stipulated, the 
prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment can be exemplified. 
The Human Rights Council considers it a right of all persons deprived of 
liberty to be treated with humanity (under Article 10(1)). This is supported 
because of its close connection with the prohibition of torture (Article 7). In 
the Committee’s opinion, non-derogable category also includes prohibition 
against taking of hostages, abductions, or unacknowledged detention.
111
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1.2.2.5.4- Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary 
 
Paragraph 3 of article 17 (2) draws the last form of unwillingness where 
proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or 
impartially, and conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. It should 
be noted however that articles 20 (3) and 17 (2) (b) contain quite identical 
wording.
112
 The main difference between them lies in the fact that the 
former applies to proceedings prior to the conclusion of a trial and the latter 
to when a person has already been tried by another court.
113
  
 
Both concepts of ‘independence’ and ‘impartiality’ are not defined in the 
Rome Statute however; they are well-known concepts in human rights 
law.
114
 Hence, given the content of article 21 (3) which requires the Court to 
interpret the terms consistent with internationally recognized human rights, 
drawing upon the interpretation of the two concepts within the field of 
human rights would provide significant guidance for interpreting them in 
the context of article 17 (2). 
 
The two concepts have been defined separately in human rights provisions. 
Independence on the one hand means independence of the judiciary from 
the executive and the legislator as well as from the parties
115
 and protected 
from outside pressures. General Comments number 13 and some authors 
assert that in determining whether such independence exists, matters such as 
the manner of appointment of members of the judiciary and their terms of 
office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures, the question of 
whether the judicial organs display a posture of independence, as well as 
other objective evidence have to be taken into consideration.
116
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lack of independency could be situations in which the state is encountering 
instability because of various potential causes such as political transition, 
natural disaster, lack of resources or lack of central power. The 
independence should not be deemed just institutional because it also 
involves the personal independence of judges in a way that they do not fear 
reprisals; they must act and decide sine spe ac metu (without fear and 
hope).
117
 
 
On the other hand, impartiality means, “not favouring one party or side 
more than another;” “unprejudiced, unbiased, fair, just, equitable.”118 In 
defining the notion of impartiality, the Human Rights Council affirms that 
“impartiality” “implies that judges must not harbour preconceptions about 
the matter put before them, and that they must not act in ways that promote 
the interests of one of the parties.”119 In the words of the first Rapporteur on 
the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, jurors and assessors, and 
the independence of lawyers, Mr Singhvi, it “implies freedom from bias, 
prejudice and partisanship; it means not favouring one more than another; it 
connotes objectivity and an absence of affection or ill-will. To be impartial 
as a judge is to hold the scales even, and to adjudicate without fear or favour 
in order to do right.”120 Examples of lack of impartiality could possibly be 
victor’s justice in a way that the victor takes over the whole process of 
adjudication of the alleged perpetrator, and politically motivated statements 
made by judges or persons responsible in the judiciary. 
 
By analysing the notions of ‘independence’ and ‘impartiality,’ this question 
will arise: Would the mere lack of independence and impartiality trigger the 
Court’s jurisdiction, or would it be inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person concerned to justice according to the wording of the article? It seems 
that the mere lack of independence or impartiality is inevitably inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice. On the contrary, it is 
said that the existence of the phrase is not for nothing. In fact, it has been 
stipulated for further clarification.
121
 
 
As we observed, the most important question, regarding “unwillingness” is 
to what extend it should rely upon the “due process recognised in 
international law.” This question may not be answered generally for all of 
the paragraphs. However, regarding “shielding,” it is acceptable that it 
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works when it benefits the accused, while “unjustified delay” works where 
the rights of the accused is being violated. The independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary, alongside “unjustified delay,” has a close nexus 
to the capability of the judiciary. It is at the discretion of the Court to 
interpret the controversial phrases in any part of the Rome Statute, but in 
this regard, the Court is required by the Rome Statute to interpret the Statute 
as consistent with internationally recognized human rights standards 
according to article 21(3). Perhaps, if the Court opts for the “due process” 
thesis, as most scholars believe that it should, it would be an improvement 
for the Court and an enhancement of judicial standards in various states. In 
addition, if the Court refuses to apply the “due process,” the least 
requirement, perhaps called as non-derogable rights shall not be ignored at 
any time by the Court in assessment of the existence of “unwillingness.” 
 
After examining grounds of unwillingness which are required to be 
considered by “having regard to the principle of due process recognised by 
international law,” it was mentioned that another ground that renders a case 
admissible before the Court is the “inability” of the state. However, these 
two grounds shall be seen after considering whether an investigation has 
existed within the jurisdiction of the state concerned
122
. 
 
 
1.2.2.6- Inability, Article 17 (3) 
 
There are two grounds for rebutting the inadmissibility of a case vis-a-vis 
core crimes proceedings before the Court. The first one is unwillingness, 
which was introduced earlier, and the second one is when the state is 
“unable.” It should be kept in mind that it is at the discretion of the Court to 
decide whether the state is unwilling. 
Article 17 (3) reads as 
 
In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall 
consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to 
obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or 
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings. 
 
In order to clarify the word “unable” referred to in chapeau of article 17, 
paragraph 3 of the mentioned article defines inability: Due to a total or 
substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the state 
is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony, or 
the state is otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
123
 This may also 
follow from the lack of a central government or judiciary in country, and the 
voluntarily relinquishment of jurisdiction due to a self-assessment of 
inability to carry out the proceedings. Potential instances for the former 
                                                 
122
 See “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire,” ICC-02/11-14, 03-10-
2011, Para 193 
123
 The Rome Statute, article 17(3) 
 32 
could be Somalia and Rwanda after committing genocide and for the latter 
the Central African Republic.  
 
In the Bemba decision, the Trial Chamber determined “that the CAR 
national judicial system is unable to investigate effectively or try the 
accused leads inevitably to the conclusion that for the purposes of Article 
17(3) of the Statute, the national judicial system of the CAR is 
‘unavailable,’ because it does not have the capacity to handle these 
proceedings.”124 The article itself provides conditions for inability which 
are: (1) A state is unable to obtain the accused; (2) A state is unable to 
obtain necessary evidence and testimony, and (3) finally a catch-all 
provision which is “the state is otherwise unable to carry out  the 
proceedings.” The last provision attempts to include all other possible 
scenarios. In all three situations, they should be due to a “total or substantial 
collapse” or “unavailability of the judicial system” and thus it requires a 
causal link to be proved. The Rome Statute does not contain further 
definition of the requirements for the total or substantial collapse of a 
judicial system. The travaux préparatoires, having considered the adoption 
of the Rome Statute, tend to indicate that the collapse of a state's national 
judicial system should be decided based on the presence of the following 
elements: the extent to which the State was exercising effective control over 
its territory; the existence of a functioning law enforcement mechanism; the 
ability of the state to secure the accused or the necessary evidence; and 
whether the extent and scope of the crimes committed were such that 
national jurisdiction cannot adequately address them.
125
 
 
After having discussed the admissibility criteria, for the purpose of current 
thesis, it would be important to shortly introduce the triggering mechanisms 
of the ICC in order to have better understanding over the whole system of 
complementarity from the beginning to the end. 
 
 
1.3- Triggering Mechanisms 
 
According to the Statute, article 13, there are three mechanisms used to refer 
a case to the court if the committed crimes posit within the jurisdiction of 
the Court. The first mechanism is when a State party refers a case to the 
Court (self-referral); the second is when the Security Council refers a case to 
the prosecutor acting under chapter seven of the United Nations Charter and 
third, when the prosecutor initiates a case proprio motu.
126
 Amongst these 
                                                 
124
 Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor V. John Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, judgment of 24 June 2010, ICC-01/05-01/08-802, Para 246   
125
 See HOLMES (J. T.), “The Principle of Complementarity,” in LEE (R. S.) (ed.). The 
International Criminal Court - The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, 
Results, Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp. 49 and 50. 
126
 The Rome Statute Article 13:  
“The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in 
accordance with the provisions of this Statute if: (a) A situation in which one or more of 
such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in 
accordance with article 14; (b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to 
 33 
mechanisms, the most controversial could be the Security Council referral, 
which is also relevant to the current thesis. Therefore, the legal status of the 
Security Council referral in respect to the ICC particularly regarding the 
complementarity regime of the ICC will be addressed as follow. 
 
 
1.3.1- Principle of Complementarity and the Security Council Referral 
 
Since the current thesis seeks to examine the application of the 
complementarity principle to the case of Libya and admissibility of the case 
before the ICC, the effect of the Security Council referral to the ICC and 
complementarity regime and the ability of the State to challenge the 
jurisdiction of the court are of great significance. Nevertheless, this matter 
will be discussed below: 
 
Prior to an assessment, it should be noted that since the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC threaten the peace, security and well-being of the 
international community, there is an overlap between the goal of the United 
Nations Charter in which the United Nations Security Council is in charge 
of restoring and of maintenance of international peace and security
127
. In 
this respect, the president of the ICC asserted that the ICC purposes “which 
overlap with the goals of the UN. [...] To achieve our collective aims, our 
institutions must work together. […] Cooperation is important because the 
Court and the UN are part of an interdependent system of international law 
and justice”128. In addition, some commentators even go further to support 
the superiority of the Security Council by stating that:  
 
“The Security Council’s power to conduct international judicial 
intervention derives from the Charter and is unaffected by the ICC 
Statute. Legally speaking the Council can establish further ad hoc 
Tribunals if it is of the view that the efficacy of its judicial 
intervention so requires. […].129”  
 
Although one of the triggering mechanisms envisaged in the Rome Statute 
is the referral of a case to the Court by the United Nations Security Council, 
there is no transparent mechanism as to the effect of the UNSC resolution 
on the Court as well as the State. Obviously, as it is embedded into the 
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article 13(b), the UNSC may refer a case to the court acting under its 
chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter (hereinafter UN Charter) for the 
purpose of maintaining world’s security. Perhaps this matter had not come 
to the surface until the UNSC adopted its first referral, in 2005, which was 
the situation in Darfur, Sudan.  
 
So far, there have been two cases referred by the UNSCRs. The first one, as 
it was mentioned, was Sudan and the second one was Libya. Technically, 
both States are bound by Article 25 of the UN Charter
130
 and by UNSC 
Resolutions to accept the ICC’s decisions131. In both resolutions, both States 
are bound to cooperate with the Court and not to be forcibly deemed as 
parties to the Rome Statute. In this regard article 1 of the Rome Statute 
provides that ‘[t]he jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be 
governed by the provisions of this Statute’132. Besides, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in the Al-Bashir warrant of arrest held that investigation and 
prosecution in the Darfur Situation will take place in accordance with the 
statutory framework provided for in the Statute, the Elements of Crimes and 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as a whole’133.  
 
Another question that may also arise is whether the State that is bound to 
cooperate with the ICC can make a challenge to the admissibility or whether 
it ought to confirm the court’s jurisdiction anyway. 
 
Since it is not described in the Rome Statute how the Court should deal with 
such a Situation directly, there is no doubt that the relationship between the 
UNSC referral, article 13(b) and the complementarity regime, article 17, is 
unclear
134
. In this regard, while article 18 could be used against the 
application of the complementarity regime to the UNSC referral, articles 19 
and 53 can possibly be used for the application of the complementarity 
regime to the UNSC referral
135
. According to article 18(1)
136
, when a 
situation has been referred to the Court according to article 13(a) and (c), the 
Prosecutor has the duty to notify all the State parties and those States that 
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normally exercise jurisdiction over the crimes concerned with the intention 
to proceed with an investigation. Only such States may pursuant to article 
18(2)
137
, challenge the ICC jurisdiction on the basis that it is investigating or 
has investigated their nationals or others within their jurisdiction. Security 
Council referral has not been included in the article. Therefore, it may be 
inferred that article 18 does not apply to the UNSC referral. On the other 
hand, unlike article 18, articles 19 and 53 of the Rome Statute expressly 
involve the UNSC referral
138
. Article 19(2) (b) manifests that every State 
that has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or 
prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted the case may 
challenge the admissibility of a case on the grounds referred to in article 17.  
 
In addition, article 53(2) could probably be the compelling evidence of the 
application of complementarity to the UNSC referral by considering that it 
expressly mentions the UNSC referral cases in time of the initiation of an 
investigation. According to this article, if the Prosecutor, after the initiation 
of an investigation concludes that “there is not a sufficient basis for a 
prosecution [….] the Prosecutor shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
State making a referral or the Security Council in a case under article 13, 
paragraph (b).” Furthermore, the Pre-Trial Chamber may review a decision 
of the Prosecutor, at the request of the State that made the referral or in case 
of a referral by the UNSC
139
. Obviously, there is a procedural process for 
that matter which clearly indicates that the court shall investigate the case 
according to the Rome Statute. This is also much more compatible with the 
independence of the Court as a legal body of law. Besides, it was discussed 
above that one of the rationales of the complementarity regime is to hold the 
primacy of the national criminal jurisdiction and respect for State 
sovereignty; therefore, it is also in line with that rationality
140
. Furthermore, 
as the complementarity principle is one of the most fundamental principles 
of the ICC Statute, the Security Council must respect the primacy of 
national proceedings even upon referral
141
.  Moreover, the ICC practice 
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supports the same conclusion since the ICC has held a hearing to adjudicate 
Libya’s challenge the admissibility of a case before the Court.142 
 
In conclusion, the ICC has rightly preferred to assess the admissibility of a 
case even in case of a referral of a situation by the Security Council. More 
specifically, in the referral of the case of Sudan, the ICC prosecutor affirmed 
that he was required under the Statute to examine the admissibility of the 
case. He affirmed, “Before starting an investigation, I am required under the 
Statute to assess factors including crimes and admissibility. I look forward 
to cooperation from relevant parties to collect this information.”143In 
addition, if States were completely obliged to relinquish jurisdiction without 
having rights to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction in case of a UNSC 
referral that would have been expressly a violation of the complementarity 
principle, known as the most fundamental principle of the Rome Statute. 
Also, one cannot ignore the fact that, having regard to the political nature of 
the Security Council as well as the inability of its members to deal with 
every situation equally it is very likely that it deteriorates the Court’s 
credibility and the ICC’s impartiality by potentially politically motivated 
referrals. It furthermore, despite the overlap of the goals of the ICC and the 
Security Council, endangers the character of the court as an independent 
legal institution. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Clearly, the complementarity principle is controversial following the reason 
that it is dealing with the sovereignty of States through a supranational 
institution. Striking a balance between the jurisdiction of the Court and the 
jurisdiction of the State is dependent on the circumstances that article 17 
provides, by which a case becomes inadmissible rather than admissible. In 
this respect article 17, which is the yardstick of the complementarity 
principle, contains ambiguous terms that adds more controversies to the 
controversiality of the said regime.  
 
Despite the fact that the Court has tried to improve the clarity of article 17 in 
its jurisprudence, there is still ambiguity in the article. The reason is that it 
has not been a long time since the Court came to existence and the 
complementarity regime is unprecedented.  For example, the terms 
“investigation” or “active investigation” have been dealt with in 
jurisprudence of the Court. The ICC even provided some tests in this regard. 
As an example “the same person, same conduct test” may be served. Yet, as 
Heller puts it, there are “shadow sides” within the complementarity regime. 
The matter he discusses in particular is the thesis of “due process.” Even 
though most of the Scholars are defending the due process thesis, it is still 
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unclear whether the Court will ever opt for it. It seems that it would be a 
positive improvement for the ICC to consider the minimum standards of 
human rights in assessment of “unwillingness” or “inability” of a State. It 
might encourage States to enhance their domestic judicial system as it was 
intended by the rationality of the principle. Failing to rule on questions such 
as whether the Court may intervene where the human rights of the accused 
is being violated has recently posited the ICC in an unwanted situation. This 
issue has risen during the Libya, Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi situation. This is an 
opportunity for the Court to declare its position on this matter. 
 
Another point is that the recent practice of the ICC illustrates its attempts to 
establish itself as a post-conflict effective institution. Thus, that 
automatically requires the Court to have a steady manner in dealing with 
similar issues. Every decision will be held as a valid example of how the 
ICC will carry out that task in future cases. In this respect, the lack of 
transparency in the complementarity regime will put the ICC in a difficult 
circumstance each time that a case with similar circumstances is referred to 
the ICC. The lack of a steady manner may lead to different outcomes for 
similar cases. That might lead to the impairment of ICC’s credibility. 
Perhaps, the best suggestion that has been put forward so far is Kavin 
Heller’s suggestion. He proposed to invite the State parties to amend the 
ICC Rome Statute in a way that it particularly meets the thesis of “due 
process.” Perhaps that would resolve many problems concerning the quality 
of the judiciary as well as the question of the violation of the human rights 
of the accused. In case of the failure of occurrence of the amendment, it 
might be recommended that the Court have the legal basis to interpret the 
Rome Statute in consistency with minimum standards of human rights, as it 
is required by article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Study case of Libya, Saif Al-Islam 
Qaddafi 
 
After discussing the complementarity regime of the ICC in the first section 
of the current thesis, Libya’s challenge to the admissibility of the ICC will 
be examined in this section. Since the ICC has striven to establish itself as a 
post-conflict effective institution, this case plays a significant role in the 
field of international criminal justice and particularly in future cases before 
the Court for two reasons.  
 
First, it will provide a better understanding complementarity principle in the 
Rome Statute since the case was challenged by the State while it is dealing 
with serious difficulties such as security and reformation from a dictatorship 
to a democratic society. This reformation, however, included the national 
judicial system. Furthermore, the ability and functionality of this judicial 
system for dealing with controversial political cases such as Saif Al-Islam 
Qaddafi was seriously doubted. 
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Second, whatever the decision of the ICC is, it will be held as an example in 
future similar cases and it will break new grounds in both international 
justice system and the ICC practice. 
 
In this chapter, relevant parts of the complementarity principle provided in 
the first chapter, will be applied to the entire case of Libya. By considering 
Libya’s challenge to admissibility, it will be attempted to answer these 
questions: “Did Libya actively investigate Saif Al-Islam’s case?” “Was 
Libya willing to investigate Saif Al-Islam’s case?” and “Was Libya able to 
investigate Saif Al-Islam’s case?”  
  
Prior to assessment and examination of the Libya case, particularly Saif Al-
Islam Qaddafi, a background to the case of Libya and other relevant facts in 
this regards will be provided. 
 
 
2.1- Background to the Situation of Libya 
 
In the outbreak of Arab Spring, after Egypt and Tunisia, Libya was one of 
the countries that were run by authoritarian leaders that started to face 
uprisings. Mohammad Moammar Qaddafi, the most powerful man in the 
country, was the head of State, de facto, and his suns were in charge of 
various substantial divisions of the country. He took over the country by a 
coup d’état against king Idris (1969). The State of Libya was formally 
governed by the general people’s congress whose secretary general was in 
theory the head of State. Despite the fact that General Moammar Qaddafi 
practically had been governing Libya since 1969, he lacked any official 
title
144
. Accordingly, the country had been ruled by fear, intimidation and 
incentives based on loyalty
145
. Lacking a rule of law and judicial 
independency were also characteristics of the administration of Libya
146
.  
 
In February 2011, a series of peaceful demonstration aimed at achieving 
reforms in the governing of the State and seeking to see the regime evolve 
into a democratic form, had shortly turned into a nasty bloodshed in which 
thousands of people were massacred. The first demonstration took place in 
16 February 2011. Nevertheless, it was followed by the arrest of Mr Fathi 
Terbil, a well-known lawyer and a human rights defender, by the internal 
security forces. This prompted mass protests in Benghazi. The day after, the 
protest spread to Al-Badaya, Al-Quba, Darna, Tobruk, and Tripoli on the 
17
th
. The security forces of Libya applied various measures such as batons 
and tear-gas to disperse demonstrators; substantial numbers of casualties 
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were reported too. As the protests were permeating all over the region, the 
security forces opened fire with live ammunition in several locations
147
. 
When the news spread, the protest proliferated all over the country. It was 
reported that a large number of people were injured by government forces in 
Benghazi, the biggest city in Libya, Ajdabia, and Al-Baraq Airport in Al-
Bayda on 18
 
February and in Mesrata on the 19
th
.  
 
Gradually, the protest was turning more offensive to the extent that the 
protestors took over Benghazi Airport on 20
 
February. The protest 
transformed into a civil war whereby the protestors and government forces 
exchanged fire and the protestors started to attack government buildings. 
For instance, on 21 February, on Libyan national television, Saif Al-Islam 
Qaddafi asserted, “we will fight to the last man and woman and bullet.”148 
This was also followed by Colonel Qaddafi’s announcement on 22 February 
that he would lead “millions to purge Libya inch by inch, house by house, 
household by household, alley by alley and individual by individual, until 
[he] purif[ies] this land.”149 He also called protestors “rats” who needed to 
be executed and blamed foreigners for the bloodshed
150
. The days after were 
followed by escalated clashes in Tripoli, and as a result, the media reported 
that the Government forces utilized fighter jets and live ammunition against 
protestors in the capital, even though government sources rejected the 
reports and asserted that they were released on remote areas and not areas 
populated with civilians.  
 
While the armed opposition had gained control over some areas of Libya, 
government forces were also trying to retake control of various cities.  By 
late February, an armed conflict had begun between the armed opposition 
and government forces.  On 2 March, in Benghazi, a political faction called 
the National Transitional Council (hereinafter NTC), led by Mustafa Abdul 
Jalil (the former minister of justice), was established. They announced 
themselves representing Libya. It had promptly been recognized by France, 
Gambia, Jordan, Kuwait, Maldives and Qatar. Consequently, on 26 
February, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1973 
authorizing a no fly zone over Libya and the taking of “all necessary 
measures” to protect civilians from the government forces of Libya.151 
Consequently, air strikes began on 19 March under the initial leadership of 
the United Kingdom, France and the United States. Accordingly, NATO 
took control of the military operation on 31 March. 
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2.1.1- Current situation after Revolution in Libya 
 
After the uprising had started in Libya and turned into a civil war, a political 
entity named the National Transitional Council (NTC) was leading the 
opposing power during the civil war. The de facto governance of the NTC 
continued for almost 10 months after the end of the war where the Libya 
Arab Jamahiriya was overthrown by Libyan people in cooperation with the 
international forces. On 5 March 2011, the council issued a statement in 
which it declared itself the “only legitimate body representing the people of 
Libya and the Libyan State”152 Subsequently, after that period, they held an 
election to a General National Congress on 7 July 2012 and handed the 
power to the newly elected assembly on 8 August 2012. It is, furthermore, 
noticeable that in this election, secularist parties had won most of the seats 
that were reserved for parties ( 39 seats out of 80) and a large number of 
independent candidates won other seats (200 in total).
153
 Despite the fact 
that secular parties gained most of the seats, the overall orientation that the 
assembly would have was unclear owing to the fact that 120 seats of the 
assembly were occupied by independent candidates.
154
 Therefore, the result 
seemed to be vastly dependent on their allegiances with political parties. It 
was hard to predict how these people were going to find common ground to 
form a cohesive government capable of projecting consistent policies.
155
 
More importantly, it seemed that the GNC had so far not shown much 
improvement concerning the reformation and decision making in Libya and 
particularly in the new judicial reformation of the State.  
 
Moreover, various reports and human rights organizations asserted that 
there has been serious concern regarding human rights abuses in Libya. In 
this respect, the Supreme Judicial Council of Libya stated its commitment to 
restructuring the Libyan judicial system to ensure its impartiality and 
independence
156
. The Human Rights Watch has been criticizing Libyan 
authorities for their treatment and their inability in dealing with former 
government officials and other detainees in the country’s detention centres. 
It estimated that there were 8000 detainees in almost 60 detention facilities, 
mostly run by militia in different parts of the country
157
.  
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In the most recent report of 17 September 2012, the United Nations Support 
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), in its report named “Transnational Justice- 
Foundation for a New Libya” emphasized “until now, there is no uniform 
process of national reconciliation in Libya.” It also stated,  
 
“While the National Transitional Council enacted a transitional 
justice law entitled ‘Laying a Foundation for National Reconciliation 
and Transitional Justice,’ it is not clear whether the law as currently 
conceived will allow for a dynamic truth-seeking process. The law 
was not broadly consulted before it was passed and its goals are 
unclear. The Fact-Finding and Reconciliation Commission 
established by the law and composed purely of senior judges, 
appears to be a quasi-judicial process that may not provide sufficient 
scope for examining legacies of violations, reflecting on them 
through public hearings, and creating a space for victims to air their 
views. Victims are not mentioned in Libya’s law except in relation 
to compensation. There are other legal challenges to moving forward 
too. Several amnesties were passed by the NTC and risk promoting 
impunity. These laws may need to be readdressed with the new 
General National Congress in place.”158  
 
It then concluded by advising both the government and national congress to 
prioritize the establishment of an effective and fair justice system over the 
next 12 months.
159
  
 
 
2.1.2- Libya Security and Militia Groups 
 
After the events resulted in the collapse of the State through a civil war and 
an international intervention, it is not surprising to see instability in Libya 
until the time when the State is governed by a democratic government, a 
powerful police and an effective judiciary with the power to enforce its 
decisions. Perhaps, it is crucial to have all the parties settled down through 
national reconciliation.  
 
Following the October 2011 Libyan Revolution that toppled the regime of 
Mommar Qaddafi, the security in the State has been precarious.
160
 
According to BBC reports, up to 1,700 different armed groups have 
emerged from the disparate Libyan rebel forces, which fought Muammar 
Gaddafi's regime in 2011, but after the killing of the US ambassador 
Christopher Stevens in Benghazi on 11 September, the government says it 
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will disarm the militias
161
. On the same day, the deputy of the prosecutor 
general was kidnaped; however, he was released consequently
162
. 
 
In its recent report regarding Libya Security, the UNSMIL reported the 
weakness of the national police, and the inability of central authorities to 
enforce the rule of law in the State. Recently, the improvement of the police 
in acting swiftly as well as a national judicial system has been reported too. 
Tarek Mitr, asserted in this respect that progress towards improving Libya’s 
security situation remains “slow, but it is real.”163 
 
It seems that security has been growing during this time, according to the 
reports and news, but still serious concerns have remained. 
 
 
2.2- Jurisdiction of the ICC over the Libya Cases 
 
It was mentioned that there are certain crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. Upon the referral by the UNSC of the Libya case to the ICC, after 
investigating the situation, the Office of the Prosecutor declared, 
 
After thorough consideration of factors […] and on the basis of the 
information evaluated and analysed, on 3 March 2011, the Prosecutor 
determined that the statutory criteria for the opening of an investigation 
into the situation in Libya since 15 February 2011 has been met.
164
 
 
Charges brought before the ICC by the prosecutor are the crimes against 
humanity of murder and the persecution of civilians within the meaning of 
article 7(1) (a) and (h)
165
. Consequently, the Pre-Trial Chamber concluded 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Moammar Qaddafi, Saif Al-
Islam Qaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi have been involved in committing 
those crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, and should 
therefore be arrested
166
. 
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2.2.1- Background of the case of Libya and Saif Al-Islam before the ICC 
 
On 26 February, following the suppression of the uprising by the State of 
Libya, the United Nations Security Council, acting under chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter, for the first time in the UN history, unanimously 
adopted resolution 1970, referring the Libya situation to the ICC 
prosecutor
167
. A week later, on 3 March 2011 following an examination of 
the situation, the prosecutor announced that according to the information 
available to him, he had reached the conclusion that an investigation into the 
situation in Libya was warranted and that he would consequently open an 
investigation
168
. The day after, 4 March 2011, the presidency of the court 
issued a decision and assigned the situation to the Chamber. Afterwards, on 
16 May 2011, the prosecutor, considering the information at hand, 
according to article 58 requested 3 warrants of arrest for Moammar Qaddafi, 
Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi and Abdullah Sanussi for their alleged criminal 
responsibility for the commission of Crimes against humanity of murder and 
persecution of civilians from 15 February 2011 onwards through Libyan 
State apparatus and security forces
169
. After the prosecutor requested 
warrants of arrest, the court (pre-trial chamber I) in its decision on 27 June 
2011, concluded that there were reasonable grounds to issue warrants of 
arrest for the persons concerned
170
.  
 
Amongst those three, however, Moamar Qaddafi, the former Libya head of 
state was killed by Misrata militiamen on 20 October 2011 while he was 
escaping Mesrate
171
.  
 
The second suspect, Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi, reportedly fled to the town of 
Bani Valid. According to Human Rights Watch, he was slightly wounded in 
an October 17 NATO airstrike on his convoy in Wadi Zamzam as he tried to 
flee towards Sirte. Militia members of the western city of Zintan captured 
him on November 19 near Libya’s southern border172. The third suspect, 
Abdullah Sanussi, Qaddafi’s intelligence chief, fled to Mauritania. He was 
captured there and on 17 March 2012 was extradited to Libya. 
 
After Libya confirmed the arrest of Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi, the court pleaded 
the suspect to be handed over to the ICC custody by means of the 
implementation his arrest warrant. In response, the NTC announced in 2011 
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that Libya is willing to prosecute the suspect itself and it is willing to 
challenge the ICC jurisdiction. In May 2012, the NTC submitted an 
application on behalf of the Libya Government (hereinafter Libya 
Application), requesting an oral hearing on the admissibility challenge 
pursuant to article 19 of the Rome Statute. It argued that the cases against 
the former officials in the government of Muammar Qaddafi should be 
deemed inadmissible because domestic investigations and prosecutions were 
underway in Libya
173
. The first hearing took place on 9-10 October 2012 
and consequently the Court required further submissions on issues related to 
the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi from Libyan 
authorities
174
. 
 
The starting point of this process was the UNSC resolution, according to 
which the case was referred to the ICC, and which obliged Libya to 
cooperate with the Court. Thus, the effect of the Security Council referral
175
 
in the current case will be addressed below: 
 
 
2.2.2- Security Council Referral and Libya Obligation to Cooperate 
 
The ICC jurisdiction over Libya was granted by the UNSC resolution no. 
1970, 26 February 2011. As it was provided in the Rome Statute, article 
13(b), one of the triggering mechanisms is the UNSC referral acting under 
chapter VII
176
. Resolution 1970 outlined some issues including the referral 
of the case to the ICC prosecutor, and obliged Libya to cooperate with the 
court. The UNSCR reads as follow: 
 
4. Decides to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 
15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court;  
 
5. Decides that the Libyan authorities shall cooperate fully with and 
provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor 
pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not 
party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges 
all States and concerned regional and other international 
organizations to cooperate fully with the Court and the Prosecutor; 
 
Libya’s obligation to cooperate depends on whether it is among the states 
that are bound to cooperate without challenging the court’s jurisdiction.177 
Following the above mentioned discussion, and the lack of transparency of 
the Rome Statute in this respect, it was concluded by inference from articles 
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19 (2) and 53 of the Rome Statute that the State concerned is allowed to 
challenge the jurisdiction of  the court according the criteria enumerated in 
articles 17 and 19 of the Statute. 
 
Moreover, it was also discussed that, according to the UNSCRes, the State 
of Libya is obligated to cooperate with the Court and this obligation is 
originated from the UN Charter article 25
178
. However, this matter, 
according to the ICC practice, does not indicate that the State is lacking the 
capacity to put forward a challenge to admissibility. In fact, this matter is 
further supported by article 16 of the Rome Statute.
179
 
 
On 1 May 2012, the NTC challenged the admissibility of the case against 
Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi and Abdullah Al-Sennusi. Consequently, the court 
granted permission to postpone their surrender to the ICC, pending a 
decision by the court’s judges on admissibility issues.180 Therefore, it is 
clear that the court opted to grant the possibility of challenging the court’s 
jurisdiction even after the Security Council had referred the case to the 
court. 
 
 
2.2.3- Legal Ground to Indict Saif Al-Islam 
 
After the referral of the case to the ICC by the UNSC, the ICC issued 3 
warrants of arrest for Moammar Qaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi and 
Abdullah Senussi for the commission of the crimes against humanity of 
murder and prosecution.
181
 On 3 March 2011, the Office of the Prosecutor 
formally declared that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Saif Al-
Islam Qaddafi, as de facto prime minister of Libya, had been involved in 
committing those crimes, which fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.
182
 
Following that announcement, the Pre-Trial Chamber I issued his warrant of 
arrest, accusing him of committing the crimes against humanity of murder 
and persecution of civilians within the meaning of articles 7(1) (a) and 
(h)
183
. 
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2.3- Admissibility of Libya cases before the ICC: Complementarity in the 
case of Libya 
 
On 1 May 2012 through an application pursuant to article 19, the NTC 
officially challenged the court’s jurisdiction. The challenge was made on the 
ground that Libya’s “national judicial system [was] actively investigating 
Mr Qaddafi for his alleged criminal responsibility for multiple acts of 
murder and persecution.”184 It then claimed that “the national proceedings 
concerning these matters [were] consistent with the Libyan government’s 
commitment to post conflict transitional justice and national reconciliation; 
“[I]t reflects a genuine willingness and ability to bring the person concerned 
to justice in furtherance of building a new and democratic Libya governed 
by the rule of law.”185 They moreover believed that “to deny Libyan people 
this historic opportunity to eradicate the long-standing culture of impunity 
would be manifestly inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Rome 
Statue, which accords primacy to national judicial system.”186 They 
consequently requested the court to declare the case inadmissible and 
withdraw the surrender request of the two suspects. 
 
Libyan government’s challenge is based on article 17(1) (a), by means of 
which, the case is being investigated or prosecuted by the State which has 
jurisdiction over the case. However, according to that article if a case is to 
be rendered inadmissible the State must show that it is willing or able to 
carry out the investigation and prosecution genuinely
187
. 
 
In the next sub-heading, the credibility of Libya’s claims by which the NTC 
has challenged the Court’s jurisdiction and its components will be examined 
and then the related parts of the complementarity regime will be applied to 
the case of Libya. 
 
In order to assess the credibility of Libya’s claim that they were 
investigating and prosecuting Saif, a few questions need to be taken into 
account. According to the jurisprudence of the ICC regarding paragraph 17 
(1) (a) there are a few things required to be considered. First, as it was 
shown earlier in examining whether the State is investigating or prosecuting 
the case, the court has to consider first whether the State is “actively 
investigating” the case,188 and then whether that investigation meets the 
requirements of the “same person, same conduct” test189 as asserted by the 
Court. These two matters, the active investigation of Libya and “the same 
person, same conduct test,” will be discussed below:   
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2.3.1- Is Libya Actively Investigating Saif Al-Islam case? 
 
Libya has based its challenge on admissibility mostly on the fact that it is 
actively investigating the case against Saif Al-Islam. 
 
The first attachment explains that Libya is adopting a new law into its 
national Penal Code to enable the General-Prosecutor to investigate crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC and purports that it is a unique opportunity 
to the national reconciliation process and to provide a trial with the highest 
international standards while emphasized the primacy of the national 
jurisdiction against the ICC complementarity regime
190
. It also stated that 
they had put so much effort into reforming the judicial system and that they 
had cooperated with the ICC Prosecutor to gather evidence
191
. Amongst 
other improvements, they claimed to have been cooperating with the 
international organization to acquire necessary technical assistance, which 
the prosecutor and the judiciary might require
192
. In addition, it was 
announced that the trial would be held public and open to UN and other 
international organizations.
193
  
 
In Annex B, the NTC shows its communications with international 
organizations such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR) and it shows the United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) requested its technical assistance to rebuild 
Libya
 194
. In Annex G, the NTC provides a constitutional declaration in 
which standards of fair trial alongside with other human rights has generally 
been enshrined
195
.  
 
Annex K contained the translation of various phases of the legal 
proceedings and guarantees for the accused in Libya Penal Rules and 
Procedure
196
. finally, annex J shows a copy of the NTC Decree to introduce  
core crimes into Libyan Legislation titled as “National Transitional Council 
Decree Recognizing the Applicability of International Crimes within Libyan 
Law;”197 it took the verbatim of article 6, 7, 8, 25 and 77 of the Rome 
Statute. In addition, Libya argued that the Prosecutor General has been 
collecting evidence and witnesses on a confidential basis
198
; it comprises 
witness statements, photographs and reports from volunteers,
199
 all of them 
positioned as confidential without any name and date.  
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Primarily, it should be noted that Libya’s effort in cooperating with other 
international organizations and its intention to enhance the rule of law and 
democracy in Libya seems remarkable. However, these attempts currently 
need to be understood in the context of the current issue, which is whether 
these attempts can deter the court’s jurisdiction over Libya cases before the 
ICC and consequently render the case inadmissible as the NTC requested. 
 
Here are some observations regarding Libya’s claims:  
 
First, according to the Libya application, its councils repeatedly emphasized 
the principle of complementarity and the primacy of the National 
jurisdiction over a case. In this regard, there is no need to say that the ICC is 
perceived to be the court of the last resort and perhaps the complementarity 
is the cornerstone of the Rome Statute
200
. Nevertheless, in fact it shall not 
outweigh the importance of the overall purpose of the Statute, as reflected in 
the fifth paragraph of the preamble, namely “to put an end to the 
Impunity”201. As important as State sovereignty is to the principle of 
complementarity, “[c]onsiderations of state sovereignty should not be 
allowed to detract the Court from the principle of effective international 
prosecutions.”202 Moreover, as found by the ICC Appeals Chamber, the so 
called ‘presumption in favour of domestic jurisdictions’ does not oblige the 
Court to accord domestic authorities leeway to allow domestic 
investigations to progress to such a point, where they would trigger the 
admissibility threshold; this presumption in favour of domestic jurisdictions 
only applies when there is, or has been, a concrete investigation and 
prosecution against the defendant
203
. According to the Appeals Chamber, 
one can infer that the Court interprets the Rome Statute in way that meets its 
purpose over State sovereignty
204
. 
 
Second, the term investigation has been defined by the Court’s 
jurisprudence as “the taking of steps directed at ascertaining whether this 
individual is responsible for that conduct, for instance by interviewing 
witnesses or suspects, collecting documentary evidence, or carrying out 
forensic analyses”205. In addition, the appeal’s chamber further provides as 
to the quality of such an investigation as “they must cover the same “case,” 
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namely the same individual and substantially the same conduct as alleged in 
the proceedings before the ICC
206
. 
 
Furthermore, not all the evidence is acceptable but since the burden of proof 
rests on the State challenging the Court’s jurisdiction, the Appeals Chamber 
asserted that the State’s evidence in support of an admissibility challenge 
must be of a “sufficient degree of specificity and probative value” that 
describes that the State is indeed investigating the case
207
.  
 
It should nonetheless be noted that the ICC additionally contented in the 
Kenya Challenge to the Admissibility Decision that the investigation or 
prosecution requires that I) the same person is being genuinely investigated 
by the national jurisdiction and II) national investigations cover 
substantially the same conduct as alleged in the proceedings before the 
ICC
208
. Hence, the application of the test – the same person, same conduct – 
in the current situation owing to the Libya claim regarding its investigation 
will play a key role in the Court’s assessment of Saif Al-Islam case. This 
test will be applied below while considering Libya’s challenge to 
admissibility. 
 
 
2.3.1.1- The Same Person, Same Conduct Test 
 
There are two claims made by Libyan authorities that require examination. 
First, they indicated that there had been investigation regarding Saif Al-
Islam launched into the allegation of financial crimes on November 2011.
209
 
Then, on 17 December 2011, they submitted that another investigation had 
been carried out in relation to “all crimes committed by Mr Qaddafi during 
the revolution.”210  
 
As to the first allegation regarding financial crimes, it should be pointed out 
that, as article 5 of the Rome Statute enumerates crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the court and as articles 6,7 and 8 provide details of those 
crimes, financial crimes, regardless of their graveness, are not within the 
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court’s jurisdiction. Consequently, that does not concern the Court’s 
jurisdiction. However, as to the second assertion, same conduct, the 
existence of the crimes according to which the accused is being investigated 
in Libya’s penal law is decisive. Since Libya has not enshrined those crimes 
in its penal law, a determinative element would be whether, as the Court 
affirmed in the so-called admissibility test, it is substantially the same 
conduct. 
 
In this regard the International Criminal Court for Rwanda (hereinafter 
ICTR) in its Statute paragraph 2 article 9 and also Bagaragaza case 
provides,
211
 
 
“According to this statutory provision, the Tribunal may still try a 
person who has been tried before a national court for “acts 
constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law” if 
the acts for which he or she was tried were “categorized as an 
ordinary crime.” Furthermore, the protected legal values are 
different. The penalization of genocide protects specifically defined 
groups, whereas the penalization of homicide protects individual 
lives.”212 
 
As we observe, there is a difference of interest between the crimes of an 
international character and crimes of national character. But there are 
authors who ambivalently assert that solely a lack specific provision for 
dealing with crimes of an international characters is not enough to render a 
case admissible before the Court. However, the Court shall take into 
consideration other factors too.
213
 
 
As stated by Libyan authorities, they have charged Saif with crimes such as 
murder, persecution and other charges not included among the ICC charges 
such as intentional murder, torture, incitement to civil war, indiscriminate 
killing, misuse of authority against individuals, arresting people without just 
cause and unjustified personal liberty in accordance with Libyan Penal 
Act
214
. These are evidently normal crimes and not crimes of an international 
character by which the court issued arrest of warrants. This has not been 
characterized by the Court yet to how to assess whether these crimes could 
be considered as substantially the same. In this regard, it does not seem hard 
to meet the first part of the test (same person, same conduct) but as to the 
second part, from a criminal law perspective, these two categories of crimes 
– crimes by which the ICC is investigating and those of the Libyan 
investigation – are different by their very nature. The reason is that the 
contextual element of the crimes against humanity, which need to be 
perpetrated as “part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
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any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack,”215 is something 
additional to the domestic ordinary crimes,  In this respect the ICC in 
Lubanga case DRC admissibility decision, the PTC I required the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to investigate not only against the 
same alleged perpetrator in the same region as the Prosecutor, but also the 
same crimes. Consequently, the court approved the admissibility of the case 
before the ICC, because the DRC did not investigate Thomas Lubanga for 
the war crime of conscripting or enlisting children into the national armed 
forces.
216
 
 
Moreover, the mode of liability is also dissimilar from domestic criminal 
law, and Libyan Penal Act is not an exception. Normally crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the court are crimes committed by individuals who do not 
soil their hand in the material element of the crime. For that reason, the 
Rome Statute provides perpetration through other individuals through 
another person or group of persons acting with a common purpose as the 
principal perpetrator
217
. As an instance, in the present case, Saif is being 
accused of conducting those perpetrations as an indirect co-perpetrator
218
. 
This is different from the international criminal system, in which such a 
person might just be recognized as responsible for a second-hand perpetrator 
under titles such as aiding or abetting in national criminal law, much less 
grave that those perceived by the Rome Statute.  
 
Moreover, it was already pointed out that crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court are crimes of international characters
219
, which violate universal 
values. In this respect, it is obvious that regular crimes do not bear any 
interest to international concerns and universal values and thus they do not 
meet one of the purposes of the Rome Statute to address crimes of 
international concerns. 
 
The ordinary meaning of “substantially,” that is an adverb of the adjective 
“substantial” explains that it means “to a great or a significant extent” and 
for the most part essentially. Therefore, if one reads it together with the first 
element of the admissibility test, one might conclude that so long as national 
authorities are to a great or significant extent investigating the same person 
for essentially the same conduct, then they may succeed in retrieving their 
national jurisdiction and rendering a case inadmissible before the Court. In 
total, the author is of the view that, as reasoned above, it is  by no means 
possible to interpret a collection of ordinary crimes within the national 
criminal rules to substantially the same conduct as those enumerated in the 
Rome Statue. The first reason is that national and international crimes serve 
different purposes. The second reason is that the application of mode of 
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liability in international crimes is dissimilar to that of national criminal law. 
Thirdly, the meaning of the word “substantially the same” might indicate 
that what the court means is slight differences between various criminal 
qualifications within the Rome Statute, and this must not be interpreted to 
mean that a bundle of ordinary crimes would tantamount to “substantially 
the same conduct.” In fact, in the absence of any clarification by the Court 
in this regard it remains unclear what the Court intends to apply in such a 
case.  
 
In this regard, Professor William Schabas has argued that there is no benefit 
in devaluating the admissibility challenges to “a mechanistic comparison of 
charges in the national and the international jurisdictions, in order to see 
whether a crime contemplated by the Rome Statute is being prosecuted 
directly or even indirectly.”220 Then, he proposed that the better approach 
would be to make “an assessment of the relative gravity of the offenses tried 
by the national jurisdiction put alongside those of the international 
jurisdiction
221
. 
 
Perhaps a potentially useful solution for the Libya could be introducing 
international crimes into the national judicial system to avoid facing 
confusion. Libyan authorities did so, but it has not been enacted by a 
legitimate legislator, so the effect of it remains doubtful.   
 
In total, in the present case, having considered that Libya does not have 
those crimes in its Penal Law, despite the promises that the NTC has made 
to introduce international crimes into their penal law
222
, it cannot meet the 
same conduct, the second element of the admissibility test, unless the Court 
considers the gravity approach proposed by Professor Schabas mentioned 
above. Even though the NTC issued a decree to introduce core crimes into 
its domestic law, it does not guarantee the legal effect of the decree since it 
has not been enacted by a legitimate legislative power. At its most eloquent, 
it might be interpreted as the intention of the NTC to comply with the Rome 
Statute in case of a referral by the UNSC, which inherently is originated 
from the UN Charter
223
.  
 
The next important point related to active investigation of Libya is the claim 
of the NTC regarding the confidentiality of evidence in the investigating 
phase of the Libya penal law, according to which they have justified the 
vagueness and lack of specificity of their witnesses and other evidence. Here 
the credibility of this claim is discussed below: 
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2.3.1.2- Confidentiality of Evidence 
 
Libya in its defence purported that the provided evidence is confidential 
according to its domestic rules and cannot be submitted
224
. In this regard, 
the Prosecutor General may solely submit summaries
225
. That also seems to 
bring up a new issue not anticipated by the Statute. If the State does not 
display the evidence, it surely casts doubt on the question of their on-going 
investigation before the ICC. The Appeals Chamber demonstrated that it 
confirmed the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II in the Kenya case by 
remarking that the court did not confirm the Chamber’s findings not 
because:  
 
“[I]t does not trust Kenya or doubted its intention but rather because 
Kenya failed to discharge its burden to provide sufficient evidence to 
establish that it was investigating the three suspects.”226  
 
Simple reading of the court’s statement may guide us to infer the fact that 
the court widely relies on the evidence at hand rather than the promises or 
claims or wishes of the States to carry out an investigation
227
 in near future 
or in any confidential manner. Drawing upon the ECHR jurisprudence, in 
this respect, ECHR in its decision where the requesting State refused to send 
the copies of the required documents to the Court under the excuse that 
under their domestic rules they could not disclose the documents held that  
 
“[I]t may reflect negatively on the level of compliance and it is 
insufficient to justify their conduct.
228
  
 
The Inter American Court of Human Rights (OAS) has also endorsed this 
opinion by stating that:  
 
“[T]he disclosure of State-held information should play a very important 
role in a democratic society because it enables civil society to control the 
actions of the government to which it has entrusted the protection of its 
interests.”229  
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In conclusion, as we observed active investigation and its excuses have been 
dealt with by the Court so far and in this regard, one may not disregard the 
Court’s jurisprudence. In respect to State sovereignty and its primacy, the 
Court asserts that it does not oblige the Court to accord leeway to allow 
domestic investigation to progress to the extent where they would trigger the 
admissibility threshold
230
. It seems that the Court also tied the promptness 
of an investigation to its assessment of admissibility. However, it should be 
noted that in the process of assessing whether the State is conducting actual 
investigation, according to the Court’s above-mentioned statement, that 
might also be considered an unjustified delay and consequently be 
interpreted as unwillingness of the State. 
 
Regarding the “same conduct, same test” we also observed that unless the 
Court assesses the Decree issued by the NTC to introduce the Rome Statute 
crimes into its penal system as credible, it seems unlikely that the Court 
would declare the case admissible based on the investigation of Libya for a 
bundle of ordinary crimes. Another approach for the Court could be the 
gravity approach asserted by Professor Shabbos. In fact, it was mentioned 
earlier
231
 that one of the supportive pieces of evidence that Libya attached to 
its application to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction was a decree to introduce 
the core crimes into their penal system which in itself could be regarded as 
supportive of the fact that the investigation of ordinary crimes might not 
possibly satisfy the court to render a case inadmissible in favour of Libyan 
authorities. 
 
And finally, according to the ICC jurisprudence, if Libyan authorities are 
about to justify a part of their clarity of evidence by recourse to their 
domestic provision which asserts the confidentiality of investigation during 
the investigation, it may reduce the clarity and probative value of the 
provided evidence before the Court since that is neither contributory to their 
claim on their active investigation nor approved by other international 
judicial bodies as an acceptable excuse. 
 
It should be pointed out that the decision of the Court that required the 
Libyan authorities to put forward further submissions to support their 
claim
232
 represented the lack of probative values of their evidence that they 
were actively investigating cases in Libya to that date or a rejection of their 
excuses to keep parts of their investigation confidential. However, there are 
other criteria that the Court, according to article 17, shall take into 
consideration to decide whether the State is “unwilling” or “unable” to 
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investigate the case genuinely if it proves that there is actually an 
investigation going out. In the next two headings, both issues will be 
analysed: 
 
 
2.3.2- Is Libya Willing to Investigate Saif Al-Islam’s Case Genuinely?  
 
As to the admissibility of a case before the ICC, it was mentioned that 
article 17 is the yardstick for that particular purpose. The article was 
described and examined in section one
233
. Additionally, the relevant part of 
the article in Saif’s case and Libya’s challenge to admissibility was 
considered in the previous sub-headings. Those data will be used in this 
section for the purpose of the current thesis to apply the complementarity 
principle to the Libya Case, particularly Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi and the 
question of whether Libya is willing to investigate Saif case genuinely. 
 
The first criterion, as described in article 17, is whether the state, which has 
jurisdiction over a case, is investigating or prosecuting the persons 
concerned genuinely. Accordingly, that initiation deters the Court from 
exercising jurisdiction over the case.
234
 
 
In this section, it will be attempted to examine this aspect of the Libya Case 
by considering the whole picture of the State and other events which might 
be relevant to assessing whether this claim of Libyan authorities is credible 
and consequently whether it will render the case inadmissible before the 
court based on the willingness of Libya to genuinely investigate Saif Al-
Islam. However, these grounds of unwillingness shall be considered after 
ascertaining that there was an investigation as the Court contended in the 
Katanga decision.
235
 
 
As to the question of the willingness of the Libyan authorities in the present 
case based on article 17 (2), it is required to apply the perceived situations in 
the article, “shielding the person concerned,” “unjustified delay” and “lack 
of independence and impartiality of the State,” to the retained facts from the 
Libya situation.  
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2.3.2.1- Is Libya Shielding Saif Al-Islam? 
 
The first form of unwillingness has to do with whether the State in the light 
of the due process recognized in international law is shielding the suspect. 
Article 17 (2) (a) provides:  
 
“The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national 
decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person 
concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article.”  
 
One of the criteria provided in defining unwillingness of the State is 
whether the investigation is being conducted, in the present case, for 
shielding Saif Al-Islam from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court. The word “shield” as a verb means protect from a 
danger, risk or an unpleasant experience
236
. 
 
A question may arise: What if the purpose of the investigation is to harm the 
person concerned intentionally by deterring the ICC jurisdiction where the 
rights of the accused have been violated fervently and overzealously? Could 
the court consider that as shielding the person from criminal responsibility? 
 
Here the Libya claim that Saif Al-Islam proceedings is a matter of highest 
national importance in bringing justice for the Libyan people and also 
demonstrating the capability of their judicial system and fair trial is 
noticeable. The reason is that, as they claimed, their attempt to deter the 
Court’s jurisdiction is for bringing justice for the Libyan people and for 
demonstrating the rule of law and the capability of the national judicial 
system in Libya
237
. However, criminal responsibility is not revenge; it is 
punishing the wrongdoer while protecting him from violations of his rights. 
Although some commentators deferred, this is perhaps the reason to 
incorporating the “international due process” in the beginning of the 
article
238
. In addition, in a very far-fetched interpretation of the “shielding 
the person concerned” from criminal responsibility, “shielding” may be 
interpreted as depriving the perpetrator from his inherent rights. 
 
It was discussed in the relevant chapter that “shielding the person 
concerned” is an internal condition, which needs the devious intent of the 
State. It necessitates a causal link between State’s purpose and inadequate 
procedural steps. In addition, it should be said that it normally works in 
favour of the accused. To this date in the present case, given the fact that the 
Zinitani militia is holding Saif and considering the hardships that he has 
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been facing in meeting with his lawyers
239
 and having the other rights that a 
normal suspect would have, there is no proof that Libya is taking these 
Steps in favour of Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi. Libyan authorities asserted that 
the purpose of challenging the Court’s jurisdiction is to bring justice for 
Libyan people and demonstrating the rule of law. The asserted purpose, as it 
was pointed out, is not just favourable but also desirable for the Court
240
. 
Thus, this statement would not indicate a devious intent. 
 
This devious intent shall be particularly for shielding Saif.  Libya claims 
that it is actively investigating the case contrary to the current situation in 
which the Court is doubtful that Libya is. Could this prove the 
“unwillingness” of Libya for the purpose of shielding? The answer should 
be negative since the “unwillingness” premised on shielding does require a 
causal link between the devious intent of the State and shielding Saif. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the scholars are of the view that 
shielding must work in favour of the suspect not where his rights have been 
violated
241
. 
 
It was also asserted that in interpreting the three criteria of unwillingness, 
some argue that the persistent violation of the suspect’s rights should be 
considered as unwillingness of the State
242
 but not under the criterion of 
shielding but rather under other criteria such as “lack of impartiality and 
independence of the judiciary”243 or “inability”244 of a State or where it 
meets the “unjustified delay”245 requirement. 
 
In sum, it does not seem that the NTC is trying to shield Saif from a 
criminal responsibility but it is rather depriving him from a fair trial given 
that the judicial system is not well functioning
246
 and to this date unable to 
acquire the suspect. Thus, the Court should consider the functionality of the 
national judicial system of Libya first. This matter has been dealt with in 
section “Availability of National Judicial System of Libya?”247 
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2.3.2.2- Is there an unjustified delay in Saif Al-Islam’s proceedings? 
 
Regarding the admissibility of a case and unwillingness, paragraph 2(b) 
article 17 provides that: 
 
“There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the 
circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice.” 
 
As it was mentioned earlier, due to the lack of any form of measurement in 
the Rome Statute, the court shall decide by considering various evidence at 
hand, whether a delay is unjustified. Moreover, delay should not stem from 
legitimate reasons
248
. 
 
It was discussed above
249
 that this paragraph of article 17 (2) requires three 
conditions. First, there should be a “delay,” and that delay should be 
“unjustified” and that unjustified delay should be “inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.” The application of these 
criteria will be followed below. However, it should be kept in mind that 
unlike the condition of shielding, which required a causal link between the 
devious intent of the State and the actual act of shielding, in this case, the 
mere presence of inconsistency with a bona fide investigation would 
suffice
250
. Another difference is that the shielding condition works in favour 
of the suspect, while an “unjustified delay” might be invoked even when the 
rights of the accused have been violated.
251
 
 
It was noted that there is overlap between “unjustified delay” and “trial 
within a reasonable time.” In addition, for the sake of interpreting that, one 
cannot disregard the travoux perpetarious in this respect.
252
 It is said that the 
notion of “undue delay” is considered too low by which to determine 
whether a State is unwilling.
253
 
 
In order to assess whether, in the present case, there is as an “unjustified 
delay” to bring Qaddafi to justice, the circumstances of the case are 
decisive. In the present case, it was indicated that Saif was arrested on 19 
November 2011 and since then he has been kept in detention by the Zinitan 
Militia. At the time of his arrest, the ICC Prosecutor requested Libya to 
hand him over to the Court
254
. In return, on 23 January 2012 Libya 
transmitted a request postponement of surrender of Saif Al-Islam 
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Qaddafi
255
, which was consequently rejected by the PTC
256
 on 7 March 
2012. On 22 March 2012, Libya submitted a second request of 
postponement in which it notified the Pre-Trial Chamber of its intention to 
challenge the admissibility of the case against Mr Gaddafi by 30 April 2012 
and requested a postponement of the Surrender Request pending a decision 
on that challenge.  On 4 April 2012, the Pre-Trial Chamber rendered its 
“Decision Regarding the Second Request by the Government of Libya for 
Postponement of the Surrender of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi” in which it 
rejected the Second Postponement Request too
257
 based on the reason that 
there had not been an application to challenge the court’s jurisdiction. 
Consequently, the NTC made its challenge and refused to surrender Saif Al-
Islam to the ICC. Saif was brought to a court in Libya on 17 January 2013 
for the first time since his arrest.  The Libyan Court postponed the trial until 
May, as there was no lawyer to represent him. Albeit, the trial was not 
regarding the ICC accusations but instead in connection with the incident 
that happened during his visit with his ICC-appointed lawyer, Melinda 
Taylor, as they were both accused of transmitting information that 
threatened Libya’s national security258. 
 
Until now, Saif has been detained by the Zinitani militia for 16 months and 
so far, there has been no indication of concrete steps to an investigation and 
a prosecution of him. Besides, he has not been given free access to his 
lawyers, and when he was, he was accused of threatening national security 
of Libya. In fact, the NTC has not been successful in convincing the Zinitani 
militia to hand him over to a legal detention centre under the power of the 
NTC where he can be visited by international organizations such as the ICC 
and NGOs, which would deny his expedient access to the Court.  This may 
also be associated with the fact that Libya has been experiencing 
reformation from a collapse and its national judicial system is not 
functioning well. 
 
Considering the given circumstances regarding Saif, it does not seem 
strange to consider the delay unjustified. To be justified, it is for the Libyan 
authorities, who hold the onus to prove that this delay is justified. Libya 
claimed that it is investigating the case actively and the delay is 
legitimate.
259
 Besides, they argued that under the Libyan law, the 
investigation’s details might not be revealed. It was concluded that their 
excuse for not revealing the details of the investigation might not be 
considered acceptable under the jurisprudence of other international judicial 
bodies.
260
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The second point in this respect is that this unjustified delay shall be 
“inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.” It was 
noted that in considering whether there is an “unjustified delay,” there is no 
need to prove that the State is having devious intent but rather the mere 
presence of an inconsistency with a bona fide investigation is enough.
261
 
 
As for the evidence which supports the inconsistency with a due process or 
a bona fide investigation, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (hereinafter ACHR) with respect to the case of Mr Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi called on Libyan authorities to secure his fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights262. It 
further held that 
 
In view of the alleged length of detention of the Detainee [Mr 
Gaddafi] without access to a lawyer, family or friends; and with due 
regard to the Respondent’s alleged failure to respond to the 
Provisional Measures requested by the Applicant, and the 
requirements of the principles of justice that require every accused 
person to be accorded a fair and just trial, the Court decided to order 
provisional measures suo motu; In the opinion of the Court, there 
exists a situation of extreme gravity and urgency, as well as a risk of 
irreparable harm to the Detainee (emphasis added).
263
 
 
The Libyan authorities so far have failed to acquire the suspect, and there 
has been a lack of clarity in their investigation and its details.  In addition, 
the suspect has been kept in detention for too long without proper access to 
his lawyers or a judge, and he has been denied his right to communicate 
with his family and other minimum standards that a normal suspect is 
supposed to have. Therefore, it may be adduced that there has been an 
“unjustified delay” in this case, which should render the case admissible 
before the ICC in the absence of any further justifiable explanation. 
 
All in all, as the old adage says, “justice delayed is justice denied.” The 
questions of Libya’s collapse and the availability of its national judicial 
system will be discussed in different sections. 
 
 
2.3.2.3- Are Saif’s Proceedings Being Conducted Independently and 
Impartially? 
 
The independence and impartiality of Libya is one relevant factor for the 
ICC when making its decision regarding admissibility.  
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It was stated that due to the lack of the definition of independence and 
impartiality of a judiciary system, human rights provisions could be helpful 
if they are applied to various situations including Libya.
264
 General 
comment 13 provides conditions, inter alia, the existence of guarantees 
against outside pressures and the question of whether the judicial organs 
display a posture of independence as well as other objective evidence that 
have to be taken into consideration.
265
 Moreover, as for impartiality, both 
institutional and individual impartiality are intended. 
 
In this respect, the characteristic of the former regime’s judicial system is 
relevant. Allegedly, the lack of independence and impartiality were defining 
features of the Libyan legal system
266
. By February 2011, with the collapse 
of the Qaddafi regime, the NTC has primarily declared its intention to 
improve democracy and the rule of law
267
. It was followed by the issuance 
of a Constitutional Decree within which the independence and impartiality 
of the judiciary as well as fair trial standards were embedded. 
268
 Yet, 
despite all these positive attempts, there seem to be challenges ahead
269
. In 
this regard, Judge Marwan Tashani, the head of the Libyan Judges 
Organization, stated,  
 
“[T]he continuing detention of many of the members of Gaddafi’s 
brigades and figures of his regime without questioning or according 
them any due process further illustrates the weakened role of the 
judiciary in ensuring the supremacy of the rule of law.”270  
 
As for the indicative features of impartiality and independence, outside 
pressures over the judiciary in Libya are noticeable. As it was pointed out 
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earlier, the militia power is still uncontrollable
271
. Attack on judges and 
courtrooms have been reported.
272
 The number of detainees is also 
indicative of the extent of the power of militias. In this respect, the recent 
UNSC resolution is relevant. On 14 March 2013 the Security Council 
expressed deep and grave concern at “the lack of judicial process for 
conflict-related detainees, many of whom continue to be held outside State 
authority […] reports of human rights violations and abuses in detention 
centres […] continuing reports of reprisals, arbitrary detentions without 
access to due process, wrongful imprisonment, mistreatment, torture and 
extrajudicial executions in Libya”273. Moreover, militia groups conducted an 
attack against the ministry of justice in response to the government attempts 
to take control over the detainees.
274
 After taking these incidents and other 
features into account, even before examining the impartiality and 
independence of the Judiciary, one may consider the ability of the judicial 
system. A judicial system must first be functional and then it may be 
independent and impartial. 
 
There is a substantial link between a country’s security and the impartiality 
and independence of its judicial system. Certainly, if judges and other 
members of the judicial system do not feel safe and secure, consciously or 
unconsciously, they would not be able to carry out an investigation in the 
interest of justice. After taking these incidents and other features into 
account, even before examining the impartiality and independence of the 
Judiciary, one may consider the ability of the judicial system. A judicial 
system must first be functional and then it may be independent and 
impartial.  
 
The report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on 2 March 2012 
describes Libya’s judicial system: 
 
“The judicial system is not functioning effectively, and suffers from the 
legacy of its past, when it was used as a tool of repression. At the time 
of the uprisings in February 2011, Libya had a parallel judicial system 
for cases deemed political and was subject to political pressure. 
Lawyers, judges, activists and other Libyans interlocutors told the 
Commission that [...] the system [...] lacked any independence and 
credibility in political cases. It is therefore unsurprising that the judicial 
system collapsed in the aftermath of the conflict and continues to suffer 
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from a lack of trust by victims seeking redress and the Libyan public at 
large.”275 
 
Consequently, having considered the present case at hand, it seems the first 
thing that the court should decide upon is whether Libya is able to carry out 
the investigation and proceedings genuinely. Given the security in the State 
and reconstruction of the judicial system as well as the fact that this judicial 
system does not have any reputation to be assessed by, it seems highly 
probable that the judicial system is suffering from a fragile independence or 
impartiality, even if we consider them independent and impartial after 
Qaddafi, while the power of militia still can threaten individuals or 
government officials. In such situations, the ICTR has taken into account the 
“sufficient risk of interference”276 in Youssef Munyakazi case that where 
there is sufficient or reasonable risk of interference with the judiciary, the 
Court may find it competent to adjudicate the case.
277
 In the absence of any 
relevant decision in the ICC jurisprudence, the Court may find it applicable 
due to the fact that despite the serious attempt of Libya to reform its judicial 
system, evidence indicates that there exists “sufficient risk of interference 
with the judiciary.” This assessment would be underpinned by considering 
two reasons: first, the lack of sufficient functionality of the Judiciary, and 
second, the existence of the power of militia groups. Latest reports also 
confirm the power of militia in Libya to the extent that it requested other 
States to evacuate their nationals from Libya
278
. Non-functionality of the 
judiciary and militia power would lead us to the question of whether the 
State is actually able to investigate and prosecute. This question is 
considered below: 
 
 
2.3.3- Is Libya unable to Prosecute within the Context of Article 17 (3)? 
 
Article 17 (3), reads as follow:  
 
“In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall 
consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability 
of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused 
or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry 
out its proceedings.” 
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What seems to be determinative first is whether Libya is encountering a 
total or substantial collapse, and second, whether Libya’s judicial system is 
unavailable. The two statuses are discussed below, considering the current 
situation of Libya. 
 
 
2.3.3.1- Is there a total or substantial collapse? 
 
As it was described above, Libya’s revolution was followed by an 
international humanitarian intervention authorized by the UNSCRes No. 
1970. The former government was toppled and the head of the state was 
killed by the rebels and militias. The United Nations Commission of Inquiry 
in Libya first used the term “collapsed” in its report concerning Libya’s 
judicial system
279
. 
 
In defining the status of a collapsed State, it is described as “a failed State 
with a vacuum of power,” and “within which political goods are obtained 
through private or ad hoc means. Security is equated with the rule of the 
strong. It is mere geographical expression, a black whole into which a failed 
polity has fallen.
280” The collapsed and failed States are often used 
interchangeably. A failed State is characterized as when a State has been 
rendered ineffective and is not able to enforce its laws uniformly because of 
(variously) high crime rates, extreme political corruption, an impenetrable 
and ineffective bureaucracy, judicial ineffectiveness, and military 
interference in politics.  
 
Given the security and political instability of Libya in the aftermath the 
revolution, it does not seem controversial to regard Libya as a substantially 
collapsed State. Besides, as expressed above, the power of militia has 
caused the Libyan authorities to be forced to negotiate with the Zinitani 
militia to acquire Saif. This has been confirmed by the Libyan General 
Prosecutor.
281
 Moreover, in his last court session Saif was broadcast from 
Zinitan,
282
 which may also indicate that the Libyan authorities lack the 
capacity to exercise full power all around Libya territory. In this regard the 
Security Council resolution expressing deep and grave concern toward “the 
lack of judicial process for conflict-related detainees, many of whom 
continue to be held outside State authority […] reports of human rights 
violations and abuses in detention centres […] continuing reports of 
reprisals, arbitrary detentions without access to due process, wrongful 
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imprisonment, mistreatment, torture and extrajudicial executions in 
Libya”283 is relevant.  
 
 
2.3.3.2- Is Libya Judicial System is Unavailable? 
 
It was mentioned above within the report that “the judicial system is not 
functioning.”284 Other reports similarly indicate that despite the 
improvements of Libya in this area, not only is the judicial system not 
functional but also there is a shortage of trained staff:  
 
“The interim Government is gradually restoring the judiciary by 
reopening courts and recalling judges, but there still exists a lack of 
trained staff such as prosecutors, judicial police and forensic 
investigators [...] Detainees often have limited or no access to 
families and legal counsel and are unable to challenge the legality of 
their detention or to lodge complaints about torture and ill-
treatment.”285 
 
It shall however be noted that the unavailability of the domestic judicial 
system in Libya, should be measured by criteria provided in article 17(3) 
which are 1) to be unable to obtain the accused or 2) the necessary evidence 
and testimony or 3) to be otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings. 
 
It was already pointed out that Saif was arrested by the Zinitan brigades on 
February 2011 and since then he has been kept in the custody of the 
Zinitanis. That has prompted a variety of criticism by questioning if the 
Libyan judicial system is able to investigate and prosecute the ICC suspects 
while it has failed to acquire the suspect from the hands of militias. We 
observed that Libyan authorities have been unsuccessful in gaining control 
over that process too. However, after the ICC appointed the Office of the 
Public Council for Defence (hereinafter OPCD) to represent Saif in the case 
before the ICC, the NTC provided two visits for his council, Ms. Melinda 
Taylor and her companions. OPCD’s second visit, which was reportedly 
made available after a longstanding effort of the OPCD, ended up in their 
custody for 22 days. Libyan authorities argued that they had been 
transmitting secret information during their visit with Saif. Consequently, 
they were set free after some negotiations between the ICC, the Zinitan 
Militia, and the NTC. 
 
Regarding the witnesses and evidence, however, the report of the 
international commission of inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of 
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international law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya gave less weight to the 
NTC reports and evidence than to the NGOs. It asserted that the reports 
received from non-governmental organizations were “apparently reliable,” 
while the reports received from the NTC “did not reflect the same 
evidentiary qualitative standard;” they “mainly contained either general 
denial or specific allegations not supported by evidence.”286 That may be 
caused by their unwillingness or the inability of the judicial system. 
 
Although the Libyan authorities (NTC) has been trying to draw the picture 
that Saif is actually in their custody and he will be transferred to Tripoli as 
soon as the new facility centre under construction becomes available, there 
is no indication to support their ability to obtain the suspect.
287
 Furthermore, 
Dr. Gehani, the Libyan General Prosecutor, on 28 May 2012, asserted that 
the Zinitani brigade remained unwilling to transfer Mr Qaddafi to Tripoli
288
. 
It may also appear that the State is not in sufficient capacity to implement its 
judicial orders and safeguard its security. It was concluded in the previous 
chapter that Libya could be considered as a collapsed State or at least as a 
State with a weak judicial system.
289
 Afterwards, on 2 July 2012 the 
commander of Zinitani brigades confirmed statement of Mr Gehani.
290
 
Hence, there seems lacking this particular feature, which might arguably 
prove the unavailability of the domestic judicial system. Besides, any 
difficulties for Mr Qaddafi to have access to his lawyers or legal assistance 
are a violation of his inherent rights as a suspect. 
 
There seems to be various forms of obstacles to not only Saif Al-Islam 
Qaddafi but also every politically concerned case, which could simply 
impede all phases of a trial. The PTC III in the Central African Republic 
case, whereby the judicial system is not functioning well because of 
incapacity or unavailability for any reason, asserts that: 
 
“It is self-evident that trials of this kind, if handled in a way that does 
justice to the parties, involve lengthy live testimony and substantial 
presentation and consideration of documentary evidence, lasting 
inevitably many months, and the necessary protective measures for 
witnesses may prove extremely difficult or impossible to implement by 
the national authorities […].291.” 
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In taking into consideration the capability of Libya’s national judicial 
system, the incident of detaining the ICC staff, including Melinda Taylor is 
also important. Richard Goldstone argued, 
 
“[w]hat is effectively an act of kidnapping also regrettably demonstrates 
that there is as yet no rule of law in Libya domestically. Ultimately, 
what has happened has justified the insistence by the ICC that Saif 
should be tried in The Hague.”292 
 
Moreover, according to article 17 (3), Libya should be unable to acquire the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to 
carry out the proceedings. 
 
This should be no surprise that, in Libya, there would be anger and hatred, 
particularly within the joy of the victory for the opposition, towards the 
former regime’s high-ranking officials, as well as those who did not 
surrender. This atmosphere might potentially render the situation for those 
witnesses who are in detention fearful and for those who are not in detention 
intimidating. In this respect, the issuance of the Law 37 on 2 May 2012 is 
noticeable.
293
  
 
According to that law, anyone who praises Moammar Qaddafi and his sons 
refers to them as reformers, or states anything against the interest of the 
State or the February revolution could be sentenced to 3 to 15 years in 
prison.
294
 Even though that law was overturned one and a half months later 
by the Libya Supreme Court
295
 and declared unconstitutional, it might be an 
indication of the culture of fear against the former regime’s officials by 
those who are in charge. On the contrary, that may indicate the enhancement 
of the rule of law in Libya too. Furthermore, another incident which may 
appear to be noticeable for the court and should be taken into account is 
granting amnesty for any “acts necessary by the 17 February revolution” 
and for the revolution’s “success and protection.”296 Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch along with the ICC prosecutor condemned the 
amnesty. To this date, no action has been reported from the Supreme Court 
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to the conformation of unconstitutionality. They requested the UNSC to 
send a “strong message” to Libyan authorities that they need to cooperate 
with the ICC,
297
 and the UNSC eventually did. It issued the resolution 
number 2095
298
; expressed concerns over the lack of judicial process for 
conflict-related detainees and the State’s security in general.  
 
Besides, as it was manifested by the Libyan authorities submitted in their 
application, some of the witnesses related to the case are either detained or 
not willing to be interviewed by the ICC prosecutor
299
. It is unclear and 
uncertain to what extent these witnesses have been brought under the 
support of judicial guarantees to be able to testify freely while arbitrary 
incarceration of former regime official is still an unsolved problem owing to 
the instability of the security and dearth of an agreement between the NTC 
and militia groups. Although Libyan authorities have claimed improvement 
in the rule of law and security, they admitted that there is long way to go.
300
 
 
As to the incapability of Libyan authorities, the ICC jurisprudence supports 
the objectivity of their claim. In the Bemba decision, the ICC in this regard 
contended that “[I]t is not the national courts' determination as to whether or 
not they are unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute” but 
rather it is for the ICC to do so
301
. 
 
Also in respect to the Saif Al-Islam from the Zinitani Militia, so far there 
has not been any development since he is still in their control and the NTC 
has failed to acquire him, considering other factors and situations, it can be 
concluded that Libya’s judicial system is unavailable and the State is 
encountering a substantial collapse to the extent that meets the requirement 
of article 17 (3).  
 
In fact, this could be considered as the requirement of other means of 
“otherwise unable to carry out” the proceedings at the end of article 17 (3) 
which due to the causal link between the violation of the suspect’s rights 
and the unavailability of the judicial system, can be considered one of the 
features that may render the case admissible before the ICC. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Libya challenged the ICC jurisdiction on the ground that it is actively 
investigating Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi. However, examination of Libyan 
authorities’ evidence and claims proves otherwise. It seems that this has 
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originated from the lack of capacity of the Libyan judicial system as well as 
the inability of the State in dealing with Saif Al-Islam’s case. 
 
First, as to the active investigation, Libya might not manage to pass the 
same person same conduct test provided by the ICC jurisprudence since it 
does not have the legal provisional basis to carry out an investigation 
regarding the ICC allegations. The mere issuance of a decree that introduces 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute by the NTC cannot be 
considered as legitimate, and a powerful basis for dealing with a highly 
significant political case. Additionally, referring to the necessity of the 
confidentiality of evidence according to their domestic rules may not 
possibly justify the lack of transparency in their investigations. 
 
Second, with regard to Libya’s unwillingness, according to article 17(2), 
Libya may be considered unwilling to carry out Saif’s investigation 
genuinely. Even though the condition of “shielding” might not be held 
against the Libyan authorities, there is a strong case for the existence of an 
“unjustified delay” in Saif’s proceedings. Furthermore, “independence and 
impartiality” of Libya’s judiciary system is also another ground that is likely 
to be used severely against the Libyan challenge to admissibility. However, 
one may not deny its close nexus to the ability of the State to carry out Saif 
Al-Islam’s investigation. 
 
Third, concerning Libya’s ability to carry out an investigation subject to 
article 17 (3), owing to the present condition of Libya, it is highly probable 
that Libya’s judicial system will be considered “unable” to carry out an 
investigation genuinely. To meet the criteria of inability, following the 
collapse of Libya of Qaddafi, it should not be able to obtain the accused or 
the necessary evidence and testimony or it should be otherwise unable to 
carry out Saif’s proceedings. Regarding the accused, Libya has been unable 
to obtain him from the moment he was detained; to this date, it has been 
almost 16 months. Although he is in the territory of Libya, he is not under 
the effective control of the government. Moreover, concerning the evidence 
and testimony, the evidence related to the credibility of the claim of active 
investigation suggests that the Libyan judicial system is unable to acquire 
necessary evidence and testimony. Taking all these factors into 
consideration – the lack of credibility of active investigation, unjustified 
delay, lack of independence and impartiality of the judiciary – along with 
violations of Saif’s intrinsic human rights as a detainee would lead us to the 
conclusion that Libya is otherwise unable to carry out the investigation 
genuinely. 
 
Other elements would also exacerbate the circumstances of Saif Al-Islam 
Qaddafi and would raise the “sufficient risk of interference of the judiciary.” 
First, the security of Libya and the power of militia groups is being 
highlighted everyday by news. Many examples can be found in this respect. 
Second, if all the elements are to be taken into account, it should be kept in 
mind that Saif is the most prominent remaining official from the former 
regime. Any investigation connected to him would be politically and 
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socially sensitive. Politically, because he was de facto prime minister of 
Libya, he is quite a “black box” for the NTC or other powers in the State. It 
is probable that the NTC and the judiciary would compromise in their 
investigation or dealing with issues related to the suspect in order to gain 
advantages. Socially, any decision in his regard will arguably have an 
impact on the public. It again might be taken as politically motivated. 
Hypothetically, let us imagine he will be exonerated from his accusations 
that might possibly gain political advantage or disadvantage for the NTC or 
the judiciary in the absence of compelling reasons as to the absolute 
independence and impartiality of the Libya judiciary. In the absence of any 
clear legal basis or standard as to the quality of an investigation in the Rome 
Statute, perhaps the Court may draw upon the ICTY practice i.e. the 
“sufficient risk of interference.” According to that test, a case becomes 
admissible where there is “sufficient risk of interference.” 
 
Therefore, considering all the circumstances, it is highly unlikely that the 
Court would declare the case inadmissible. There is not much of a chance to 
win for the Libyan authorities. Moreover, scholars and experts certainly 
would scrutinize this decision. This reveals the ICC’s manner of dealing 
with similar cases in the future; hence, this could be an opportunity for the 
ICC to introduce itself as a strictly legal entity. 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Final Observation 
 
The ICC has been designed to be the Court of last resort and the 
complementarity regime is perhaps the most fundamental principle of the 
Rome Statute. There would always be a competition between the 
jurisdiction of the Court and that of the State concerned where crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court were committed. Therefore, it is for the Court to 
strike a delicate balance between these two jurisdictions; each of them 
represents the interest of its originating sources: the interest of the 
international community and State sovereignty.   
 
Article 17 of the Rome Statute is the yardstick of the Complementarity 
regime where there are four grounds perceived that render a case 
inadmissible before the Court based on “unwillingness” and “inability” of 
the State to genuinely investigate or prosecute the case. Nevertheless, the 
article is not fully transparent as to the limits of the scope of the regime. So 
far the Court has not clarified the exact extend of each controversial matter 
regarding the article and the regime. Thus, it has caused confusion. 
 
In order to clarify, the ambiguities of article 17, the Court in its previous 
jurisprudence, provided some descriptions. For examples, terms of 
“investigation” or “active investigation” have been dealt with. In addition, 
the Court provided a test for the assessment of the existence of an 
investigation in the State concerned i.e. “the same conduct, same person 
test.” So far, there are “shadow sides” within the complementarity regime.  
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As an instance, the Statute is unclear whether it should declare a case 
admissible where the intrinsic rights of the suspect is being violated by the 
State. Most of the scholars suggest it should. However, it is not clear 
whether the Court would consider that as a ground of admissibility. 
Heller
302
 suggests that the Rome Statute should be amended by the State 
parties. The author shares this view and recommends that the Court have the 
possibility to interpret the Rome Statute in consistence with the human 
rights standards as it is required by article 21 (3) of the Rome Statute even if 
the attempt to amend the Rome Statute fails. 
 
The lack of transparency in the Rome Statute in various respects has 
recently positioned the ICC in a very controversial situation regarding Libya 
and Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi. After his arrest by a militant Group, Zninitani, 
Libya refused to hand him over to the ICC and challenged the ICC’s 
jurisdiction based on the ground that it is actively investigating the suspect 
while he is not under the effective control of the government. However, he 
has been held in detention for almost 16 months; no proceedings concerning 
the ICC’s allegations have been reported. According to article 17 if Saif Al-
Islam’s case is to be declared inadmissible, the State has to prove that it is 
investigating the suspect first, and then if there is an investigation, the 
matters of “unwillingness” and “inability” of the State have to be 
considered. 
 
Regarding Libya’s active investigation, evidence suggests that Libya may 
not pass the “same person same conduct” test of the ICC due to the lack of 
functional provisions for investigating crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court as well as the inability of the Libyan judicial system. Besides, the 
excuse that Libya does not have the possibility to reveal its investigative 
steps and evidence may not satisfy the Court that the State is actually 
investigating the suspect. 
 
As for “unwillingness,” subject to the article 17 (2), there is a strong 
possibility that Libya will be considered “unwilling” premised on the two 
grounds stipulated in article 17 (2) (b) and (c). First, there is an “unjustified 
delay” in Saif’s proceedings, almost 16 months to this date. Second, the 
fragile security due to the power of militia groups as well as the political 
instability and incapacity of Libya’s judicial system has casted serious 
doubts on the “impartiality” and “independence” of the judiciary in Libya. 
 
Concerning, the “ability” of Libya’s judiciary to carry out an investigation 
and requirements of article 17 (3), it seems that the strongest argument 
might be put forward in this regard for some reasons. First, lack of effective 
control of the Libyan authorities over Saif Al-Islam Qaddafi is the most 
noticeable issue that has led to his prolonged detention without a trial. So 
far, they have failed to obtain him. That problem also may indicate the lack 
of capacity of both the authority and the judiciary of Libya. Furthermore, the 
second criteria of article 17 (3) – the lack of ability to acquire the necessary 
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evidence and testimony – it has a close nexus to the claim of Libya to 
actively investigate Saif Al-Islam. It was shown that it is highly doubtful 
that Libya is actively investigating the case. And finally, as the catch-all 
provision contained in article 17 (3), taking all other circumstances together 
– credibility of active investigation, unjustified delay in Saif proceedings, 
lack of sufficient capacity of Libya judiciary, fragile independence and 
impartiality of Libya judiciary -- together with violations of Saif Al-Islam’s 
inherent human rights as a detainee would contribute to the fact that Libya is 
otherwise unable to carry out Saif’s investigation genuinely. 
 
It has been demonstrated that the major problem in the Saif Al-Islam 
Qaddafi case with regard to the prosecution of crimes committed during the 
conflict from 15 February 2011 onwards exist in the area of “inability” 
rather than “unwillingness.” The Libya case still has not been adjourned by 
the ICC but it does not seem that Libya has a great chance to win the 
admissibility challenge. The Prosecution’s position in previous cases in 
comparison with Libya’s case is striking. While the Prosecution has always 
been in a position against the State, in the Libya case the Prosecution has 
not been much of an enemy for the State. In this case, the prosecutor’s 
position has been played by the Office of the Public Council for Defence. 
Whatever is the ICC’s decision, it will be an unprecedented one, which will 
inspire future decisions. It is not clear what would be the ICC’s decision, but 
simple adoption of the complementarity principle to the Saif Al-Islam case 
does not pronounce the inadmissibility of his case before the court.  
 
However, the extent of political considerations by the Court would play a 
key role. Perhaps the change in the prosecution position in this case stems 
from political considerations, as Kenneth Rodman argues that the court and 
particularly its prosecutor must take political, conflict management 
objectives into account as it reaches decisions about prosecutions
303
 or in a 
similar vein Michael Struett asserts that the Court should pretend to be 
merely legally motivated while taking actually contextual factors into 
consideration
304
. 
 
In total, according to the provided facts, Libya is moving forward but the 
State is not stable enough to deal with a critically important political case. 
The NTC insists on carrying out the proceedings while they are aware that 
the State’s precarious situation and fragility of security may not be 
translated as authenticity in their intention to investigate Saif but rather it 
might indicate the political motivations behind the scene that increases the 
risk of interference of other parties in the case if it will be adjudicated in 
Libya. These considerations shall be taken into account by the Court 
alongside the ability of Libya in dealing with such a high-importance case in 
deciding whether they should declare the case admissible. 
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Any attempt to manage the circle of justice, as it is recommended by 
Rodman and Struett, would create the ground for application of various 
preferences by those who are responsible to manage. This will be 
detrimental to the ICC’s credibility as a significant part of the international 
criminal justice system. The Court should remain strictly legal in order to 
avoid different ruling in similar positions. In doing so, additionally, further 
clarification of the complementarity principle in order to define its borders 
would provide a better basis for the ICC to have a steady manner in its 
extraordinarily important task.  
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